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5 AUGUST 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: KORNILOV REBUTS U.S. CLAIMS OF PROGRESS THROUGH SDI

LD152005 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1445 GMT 15 Jul 86

["Who Has an Interest in the 'Star Wars' Program?" -- TASS headline]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 15 Jul (TASS) -- TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov writes:

The U.S. Administration does not intend to renounce its plans for the militarization of space and implementation of the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) program. This was again confirmed by the head of the White House, advocating comprehensive advancement of work within the "star wars" framework in his latest radio address. Trying to justify this militaristic line, U.S. imperialist circles assert that allegedly the newest scientific research in the military field, primarily implementation of the "star wars" program, will produce a "technology spurt" and provide impetus for the development of scientific thought.

Nothing could be further from the truth! Mikhail Gorbachev speaking at a meeting with representatives of the International Forum of Scientists for a Nuclear Test Ban, which was held in Moscow, said "The argument that science and technology can develop only through the arms race is an absurd argument".

Facts show that a course through the arms race and attempts to move this race into space will lead the United States not to "progress" in scientific thought, but to the total militarization of science, which would be increasingly at the service of Pentagon and the military-industrial complex. A whole network of gigantic military research institutes and centers is working a full speed "for war".

At least three-quarters of American universities and four-fifths of all development engineers have been drawn into military research. This process has reached such proportions that a number of foreign researchers, for example, F. Barnati, director of the Stockholm International Peace Institute, are talking of the creation in the United States of a "scientific-administrative-military-industrial complex, which is increasingly becoming a self-contained force, manipulated by political parties and their leadership." [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1473

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: SILO DEFENSE REAL AIM OF SDI

LD131814 Moscow TASS in English 1810 GMT 13 Jul 86

["Reagan Pushes SDI Against Mounting Criticism" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] Washington, July 13 TASS -- The U.S. Administration has no intention of dropping its plans to militarize outer space by carrying through its "Strategic Defense Initiative." This was reiterated by President Ronald Reagan, who championed in his latest radio address the intensification of work under the "star wars" program in every way.

Trying to prove the "vital need" of the development of a partially space-based ABM system, he said that the USA was simultaneously laying emphasis on the "strategic modernisation" of the nuclear force.

The President categorically rejected the possibility of discussing the SDI in negotiations. "SDI research is not a bargaining chip," he said. Reagan made it clear that work under the SDI program was going ahead full speed. He claimed that major breakthroughs had been achieved, including those in the development of ABM weapons.

Touting his brainchild, he had to admit, however, that opposition to his plans kept growing. He regretted congressional steps to cut back spending on the program in the next fiscal year and urged the Americans to put pressure on the law-makers to make them meet the administration's demands.

Meanwhile, THE NEW YORK TIMES reports, it is becoming increasingly clear that the administration's talk that the purpose of the SDI is to protect the American population from nuclear weapons is downright deception, intended to drum up support for the unpopular plans to defend the U.S. strategic nuclear forces and to dupe the world public. According to the newspaper, the Pentagon plan is "to try to defend only missile silos." The newspaper characterizes a system to defend people and cities "the sickly child of Mr. Reagan's vision" and cites facts showing that such plans are unrealistic. Yet it is the narrower goal of a missile-silo defense, according to the newspaper, that is "in the realm of the possible." Such activities, incidentally, are banned by the Soviet-American ABM Treaty.

New York, July 13 TASS -- President Reagan's stand on the Strategic Defense Initiative calls in question and even nullifies the possibility of any arms control accord, a statement released here by the national coalition against the "star wars" stresses. According to it, the SDI, camouflaged as a defense system, is actually intended to serve the offensive objective of the first nuclear strike. The program reflects the desire of the Reagan administration to achieve military superiority by all means and its fulfillment will merely spur on the arms race, destabilize the international situation and escalate the threat of nuclear confrontation with most tragic consequences for human civilisation, the statement notes.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: ZHOLKVER, AGAYANTS DENOUNCE FRG SDI PARTICIPATION

LD162301 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 16 Jul 86

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Nikolay Agayants]

[Text] [Agayants] A Pentagon representative has officially announced the granting of the first order for participation in U.S. military and space programs to a firm in West Germany. I ask our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver to talk in greater detail about this.

[Zholkver] To start with I recall that as far back as March a U.S.-West German inter-governmental agreement was signed on the FRG's participation in the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative that the Americans themselves frankly call star wars plans. At that time, both in Bonn and Washington, reassurances were made that, as they said, this is purely a formal agreement concerning only theoretical scientific problems. But, as we see, the matter is taking a fully concrete and practical turn. The West German firm has received a Pentagon order for the manufacture of a military satellite, one of many that should be put into service in accordance with the star wars program.

It is worth noting which firm this order has been given to. The Messerschmitt-Blohm firm received the order. This is the same firm that as the older ones among you probably remember, used to supply Hitler's aviation with military planes and reaped enormous profits from it. It is true that the firm's management is now trying to diminish the significance of the present deal. You see, the matter concerns an order for only \$4 million. I will note however that this is by far not the first such order for Messerschmitt -- and clearly not the last. In the past the firm already delivered to the United States a so-called space platform, which was used during the flights of the Challenger shuttle. Now it is reported that after the present Pentagon order others will follow in the near future, this time totalling almost \$40 million. So, one can fully understand the current enthusiasm of the bosses at Messerschmitt. The perspectives for new large profits are opening up for them.

[Agayants] In your view, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, what is the advantage for the American side?

[Zholkver] First and foremost, the Pentagon is very worried about the consequences of the catastrophe involving the same Challenger, the flights of which, as with the other American shuttle-type space ships, were, as is known, widely used for military purposes. Now, after the loss of the Challenger and the accidents that followed one another involving the Titan and Delta rockets, the Strategic Defense Initiative, as THE WASHINGTON POST writes, has been thrown backwards and at the present time is generally dead. Thus, to bring life back to plans for star wars preparation, the Pentagon is in

a hurry to involve other countries in it, including the FRG, Britain, and Japan. American General Rogers, NATO commander in chief, has recently come out with a special appeal for the creation of a kind of West European branch of the SDI -- a European defense initiative -- of course under the leadership and instruction of the Pentagon. There is another matter in all of this, so to speak, an internal American aspect. It is sufficiently well-known that in recent times more and more Americans, including prominent scientists and congressmen, have been pointing to the extremely dangerous nature of plans to take strike weapons out into space. A draft law has already long been under discussion in Congress that would ban such sinister designs. Now, as THE NEW YORK TIMES reported, even in the Senate the question is being considered of blocking expenditures on the star wars program. And so the Pentagon is hurrying, before these things go through, to quickly hand out its military and space orders and to leave additional loop-holes for their implementation beyond the borders of the United States. I do not think there is a need to say a great deal about how dangerous such plans are for a new and even wider spiral in the arms race.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

'EURO-SDI' WOULD HARM VITAL EUROPEAN INTERESTS

TASS Analyst Reports

LD151751 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 15 Jul 86

["Euro-SDI in the Making" -- TASS item identifier]

[Text] Moscow July 15 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshov writes:

American General Rogers, supreme allied commander Europe, urged the U.S. West European allies in his interview to THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR to develop their own ABM system. The NATO military command, according to him, has already approved the basic principles of a research and development program for such a system.

U.S. officials have long been pushing the West European allies in every way towards the fulfillment of a "European Defense Initiative," or Euro-SDI. Washington would like to use it to secure from the NATO countries a more energetic backing for the USA in the militarization of space. American officials openly characterize Euro-SDI as a "side effect," "spinoff" and "integral component" of the American SDI.

All this exposes the propaganda argument, cited by the Euro-SDI proponents to reassure the West European public, that the development of an own ABM would make the West European countries "independent" of the USA and enable them to tackle their own security problems regardless of the American SDI. Yet there are those in Western Europe who make no secret of the true relationship between Euro-SDI and the "star wars" program. NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, for instance, called upon the West European NATO members to work on an ABM system through "joint efforts" with the USA, while West German Defense Minister Woerner frankly characterized Euro-SDI as a direct complement to SDI.

The backers of Euro-SDI also argue that Western Europe will become a "low-security zone" as a consequence of the American "star wars" program and the countermeasures of the Soviet Union because the USA and the USSR will be protected from nuclear-missile strike while the West Europeans will be left "defenseless."

The fallacy of this allegation is glaring. If the West European governments were really concerned that the territories of their countries may become a "low-security zone" as a result of the implementation of SDI, it would be more logical to join the efforts for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the abolition of the "star wars" program instead of contributing, in one form or another, to the American plans to militarize outer space and build ABM systems.

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Emphasis is also laid on another propaganda argument: Euro-SDI pursues purely defensive purposes. Yet the real and main cause of this program is very different. The NATO aggressive forces and the USA backing them are hoping to use a European ABM system to defend military projects, first and foremost American first-strike weapons, such as Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, deployed in a number of West European countries, and to tip the "Eurostrategic" and global balance in favour of NATO.

Clearly, the arms race could thus be spurred on in yet another area, tension in Europe would be escalated and the war threat would grow. This is what makes such plans so dangerous: Their fulfilment would have most adverse consequences for European and international security and world stability. The implementation of Euro-SDI in combination of the American "star wars" program would harm the vital interests of all the European countries without exception -- big and small, members of military alliance and neutrals, Eastern and Western alike.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Comments

PM141457 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jun 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Reserve Major General F. Gontar: "NATO Members' Dangerous Venture"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference held in Budapest on 10-11 June pointed out that the American "star wars" program, which envisages the creation of space-strike armaments, its involvement by other states, and the drawing up in a number of West European countries of similar plans for a "European defense initiative," is becoming increasingly dangerous in character. The shifting of the arms race into outer space is undermining strategic stability on both a regional and a global scale and is erecting serious obstacles to the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms.

The Western mass media have of late been extensively commenting on the question of setting up a regional, West European ABM defense, which is known by the acronym Euro-SDI. The question has been broached in a public statements by foreign statesmen and politicians and is the subject of discussion between the United States and its West European partners. The progress of the discussion held and the practical measures being taken show that the United States and the FRG are the initiators of setting up Euro-SDI.

According to FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner, "the FRG has for several years now been developing, jointly with the United States, a system which, in terms of its tactical-technical characteristics, sets a new standard in the search for enhanced capabilities in ABM defense." For his part Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated at the beginning of this year, in an attempt to hide Euro-SDI's real aims, that the potential for combating medium-range missiles on the European Continent is being studied within the framework of the American "star wars" program only because this "was desired" by the representatives of West European NATO countries, particularly the FRG.

It is envisaged that in the initial stage ground-based ABM defense facilities will be used as the technical basis of the Euro-SDI ABM defense system being created. These comprise rapid-firing electromagnetic guns, high-energy lasers, ABM missiles, including nuclear ones, especially modernized American air defense missile complexes of the Patriot type, and air- and ground-based detection, tracking, and guidance facilities.

In imposing the Euro-SDI program on the countries of Western Europe the United States is pursuing specific aims. The first aim through cooperation within the framework of this armaments system, is to use West European NATO countries' scientific and technical potential to implement its own "star wars" program. Second, they want to soften criticism of the American space-militarization program on the part of its NATO allies and secure their full support for it.

It is noteworthy that the initial claims in the Western and particularly the West German press about "the distinctive nature of the "European defense initiative," about "European independence," and about an "independent and autonomous" regional ABM defense system being created in West Europe burst like bubbles after the interview that General Rogers, supreme commander NATO Allied Forces Europe, gave to the newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU. He said quite bluntly that where Euro-SDI is concerned it must be understood that it is no more than a mere military-technical supplement to American SDI and that the supplementary West European ABM defense system will be entirely at his -- Roger's -- disposal. Later this American general again made it clear that Euro-SDI is conceived as an offshoot and a kind of by-product of the "star wars" program. So the Washington SDI's younger sister really has arrived, and their parent is one and the same -- the Pentagon.

It should be stressed that Bonn, acting as initiator and advocate of the Euro-SDI program among the West European NATO countries, aspires to the leading role and dominating position among its bloc allies. This shows West German militarism's imperial ambitions and its irrepressible desire to oblige the senior, transatlantic partner.

Under Washington pressure, it is planned to concentrate the main efforts in implementing Euro-SDI on creating and deploying an ABM defense system to protect principally the launch positions of Pershing-2 first-strike ballistic missiles and long-range nuclear cruise missiles, nuclear weapons depots, and the airfields where aircraft carrying American nuclear combat munitions are based. Thus the United States is concerned with creating an ABM shield chiefly to protect its offensive nuclear potential in Europe rather than with the security of its European allies, as the White House politicians and Pentagon strategists often declare.

Describing the state of work on Euro-SDI, Warner noted in an interview given to the newspaper STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN that the FRG Defense Ministry has already drawn up a specific program for creating a regional, West European ABM defense system. Comprehensive military-strategic and military-technical research to develop and validate the principles and plans for its formation is being carried out at this stage.

The practical steps being taken by militarist circles in the United States and certain West European NATO countries to accelerate the work on the "star wars" and Euro-SDI programs expose the falseness of the peace-loving rhetoric about commitment to the goals of scaling down the arms race and enhance the risk of thermonuclear catastrophe. The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned of the danger of this development. The constructive new proposal put forward earlier by the USSR and approved by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference in Budapest on concerting the efforts of all the countries of the world for the peaceful use of outer space and the creation of a special international organization for the purpose are the alternative to the "star wars" program.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

TASS: FORMER OFFICIALS URGE REVISION IN U.S. STRATEGY

LD131548 Moscow TASS in English 1532 GMT 13 Jul 86

[Text] Washington July 13 TASS — A group of prominent U.S. politicians, once senior officials in U.S. Administration, call in the August issue of the ATLANTIC monthly for a drastic revision of the U.S. military strategy and the renunciation of the first nuclear strike doctrine. The call has been made by Robert McNamara, a former defense secretary, Paul Warnke, a former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chairman of the Public Committee for National Security, McGeorge Bundy, a former presidential national security adviser, historian and diplomat George Kennan, Gerard Smith, a former chief U.S. negotiator at the SALT talks, and others.

The current U.S. policy, according to the authors, relies in large measure on the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons. In the European theatre and elsewhere, the United States contemplates and plans for a first use of nuclear weapons. Though many people are unaware, they say, American policy in Asia, the Middle East and other areas also envisions a first use of nuclear weapons.

The authors say that in the current international situation the risk of conflict is especially high because the U.S. has deployed its nuclear weapons at the very border of the Soviet Union by having introduced Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West European countries. Moreover, many battlefield nuclear weapons have been deployed in Europe as well.

"The fundamental problem of the current first-use policy is that it misconstrues the nature of nuclear weapons. It assumes that nuclear weapons can fulfil conventional war-fighting roles. But even their most limited use carries an unacceptable risk of escalation of general war." The article recollects that the Soviet Union has repeatedly stated its determination not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and urges the Reagan administration to follow the Soviet example and thus to help lessen nuclear confrontation.

The authors stress specifically that, "needless to say, a policy of no first use presupposes that abandonment of the Strategic Defence Initiative." The SDI program, according to them, is "a step not toward a world without nuclear weapons but toward a world with more of them." In their view, the Strategic Defense Initiative "threatens to erode allied unity, and confidence in American guarantees, by raising the prospects of a 'decoupling' of Western Europe from the United States."

They note in conclusion that it is necessary to find alternatives to the use of armed force to avert war because there are no technological "recipes" that could replace the complex process of the regulation of political relations.

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CSO: 5200/1475

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ON U.S. ATTITUDE

LD111124 Warsaw PAP in English 1017 GMT 11 Jul 86

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Warsaw, July 11: The youth daily SZTANDAR MLODYCH today published an extensive interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, headlined "Peace and Disarmament -- Essence of Soviet Foreign Policy." Excerpts:

Obviously, we do not get desperate over the U.S. negative stance. Our activity is persevering and consistent. We tell the Americans: If you are as yet unprepared for any radical, brave moves, let us go towards at least provisional and limited measures. It is in that context that one should see the Soviet proposals.

The Soviet side is open to the lines of search for solutions, but for these to be used it is necessary that the other side takes a serious approach as well.

One also must not attempt, as Washington has, to exploit the talks as camouflage for fuelling up new arms programmes.

The framework of the SALT treaty have become too narrow for the U.S. war programmes which the present U.S. Administration refuses or is unable to stop because of the obligations towards the military-industrial complex.

Every American programme transgressing the agreed limits is accompanied by search for or invention of alleged Soviet "violations" of them.

The U.S. newly-adopted course on the SALT agreements cannot fail to affect the climate over the envisaged Soviet-American summit. But as before, we think the latter is possible.

Of course, the U.S. departure from the SALT treaties, unwillingness to move forward in Geneva, and its international policies which aggravate situation in many parts of the world are not conducive to the summit.

A natural question is whether Washington wants a new summit at all. Perhaps the talks are just a trick to delude world public.

Western militaristic circles are the strongest scared by the possibility of true disarmament. Hence a logic of absurd is being created, assuming that if the USSR puts forth

peace initiatives, it must be weak and so the arms race should be fuelled up still higher and means searched for to undercut the security of the USSR and its allies. These calculations are totally unfounded.

The USSR and its allies build up their security not only by way of negotiations, but also by improvement of their defence arsenals, including nuclear arms.

We are for the mutually balanced nuclear arsenals to be at a possibly lowest level. If the other side wishes otherwise, being all too eager to seize superiority, we are also supposed to take care of our own arsenal.

But we shall not allow the parity to be broken.

The essence of the recent dispute over overcoming of an alleged "artificial division of the (European) Continent" lies in the fact that the present U.S. Administration as well as revanchist circles in the FRG have until now refused to accommodate the fact that Eastern Europe has entered the road of socialist development.

It is impossible to reverse socio-political processes in the world. Pity they are not too good at studying historical regularities in Washington. That would spare them many troubles.

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CSO: 5200/1475

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MOSCOW TALK SHOW ON NEED FOR AGREEMENT; WESTERNERS PARTICIPATE

OW151101 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0708 GMT 15 Jul 86

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio, with Egon Bahr, member of the Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of the FRG; David Owen, leader of the British Social Democratic Party and former UK foreign minister; Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the board of APN -- Bahr and Owen speak in English with superimposed Russian translation -- recorded]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello comrades, we are coming to you from Studio 9 of the Ostankino television center for our regular television talk devoted to topical problems of world politics. I will begin by introducing the participants in our discussion today: Egon Bahr, member of the Presidium of the Social Democratic Party of the FRG; David Owen, leader of the British Social Democratic Party and former UK foreign minister; Academician Georgiy Arkadyevich Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Valentin Mikhaylovich Falin, chairman of the board of APN.

Mr Owen and Mr Bahr are in Moscow in connection with meetings of the working group of the Palme Commission. This international commission was established in 1980 by a group of prominent state and public officials of various countries and was headed until his recent tragic death, by Olof Palme, prime minister of Sweden. It has won great international prestige. The commission includes people of various political views and orientations, but they are all united by the idea of the need of creating a world secure for all. This activity of the commission has created for itself great international prestige.

The extensive report published 4 years ago by the commission was simply called: Security for All. It evoked great interest throughout the world and great support in the most diverse circles of the international public. The commission is continuing its work and I would like to begin our discussion today with a question to you, Mr Bahr. I know that the commission's meetings are confidential, but excuse my professional curiosity. I nevertheless would like to ask you, what can you tell us about the meetings that have just been held in Moscow?

[Bahr] This was a preparatory meeting at which we laid a basis for a new meeting in Budapest in late October, and we will concentrate on questions of European security. I think that we have prepared our documents on problems of European security successfully. This was our intention and we fulfilled it.

[Zorin] To start, I would like to ask you how do you members of the Palme Commission view European security? Mr Owen.

[Owen] There are different views on this question, but there is a common approach to the fact that we are at a watershed in terms of the arms race and disarmament. Either we go to substantial and important agreements, mainly between the Soviet Union and the United States, or we will arrive at no agreements at all and the entire decade of the 80's will be one of an increasing arms race and years of deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. None of us wants this to happen. Personally, I am fairly optimistic. I think that a summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will take place in Washington in December. I do not think that they will lead to very far-reaching agreements, but it seems that some limited results will be achieved.

Now the next major summit meeting in Moscow next year will, I hope, bring about a truly practical reduction in strategic nuclear arms.

[Zorin] Would you like to add something?

[Arbatov] Yes, I would like to add something. David Owen has used the world watershed. This really is the case. One can look at the situation today in different ways. It is like a large menu of events from which various dishes can be selected, and depending on the selection you get either a sour, a sweet and sour, or a sweet taste in your mouth. The situation at present really is like this. On the one hand, the threat is growing, the arms race is intensifying, and the regime of even modest agreements which were concluded with such difficulty and after such hard work during the 70's is falling apart. Tension is growing, regional conflicts are continuing and even exacerbating, and everything points the other way.

At the same time, we can see another side of the picture. The understanding, the clear understanding that this situation is intolerable, is unprecedentedly great. I think that never before have so many people on earth understood to such an extent just how senseless nuclear war and the nuclear arms race are. People are coming to this conclusion, and I think that recent years have provided a number of good lessons in this sphere.

This creates a need for actions and opportunities for actions -- a need because of the threats and an opportunity because there is already a platform of sorts, various points of view, and public opinion which puts pressure on governments and makes this possible. But this relates primarily to Europe where, in general, detente has not died. We discussed this favorable issue, and I hope that in October the plenary session of the Commission in Budapest will do something about this, will make its contribution, although of course it is impossible for the Commission or any other group of people to shoulder such a burden of responsibility. It will require the efforts of everybody -- sober-minded political parties, politicians, governments, and the public of Europe.

[Falin] I would like to add one thing, if I may. It seems to me that it would not be quite accurate to simply say that there were agreements and limited agreements. The main thing was that in the seventies a mechanism was worked out...

[Arbatov interrupts] Of an infrastructure.

[Falin] of a certain infrastructure, and the most valuable thing was that principles were agreed upon. Everything undertaken at the time was not viewed as an isolated independent act but as a system of action, a process. That is why SALT I was to be followed by SALT II, SALT II by SALT III, and so forth. Of course we can always begin from the start, from the beginning, from a coordination of principles...

[Arbatov interrupts] Well Valentin Mikhaylovich, you know they say that hope makes a good breakfast but not much of a dinner.

[Falin] That is true, but on the other hand we cannot lose those important acquisitions [Falin says a few words but no audio is carried] that were made at the time. Essentially it was decided in the seventies that there cannot be two securities, particularly in Europe. There can be only one security, one that is equal for both Western and Eastern Europe.

[Zorin] It seems to me that one of the fatal problems today -- I do not know if you will agree with me, but I think it is so -- lies in the fact that the tasks facing mankind today often do not correspond with the approach of extremely influential circles to the solution of these tasks. A kind of gulf, a division exists. What would you say about this, Mr Owen?

[Owen] Approaches really do differ, there is no doubt about this. One of the problems at the talks on limiting the arms race lies in the fact that the composition of arsenals is extremely varied. A trend toward building large land-based missiles with powerful warheads predominates in the Soviet Union, while the United States prefers to concentrate on submarines with missiles in order to achieve more strike accuracy without installing such powerful warheads.

In striving for mutually acceptable agreements these differences must be taken into account. Ultimately, agreements on limiting arms will not be worth the paper they are written on if each side does not feel every day that as a result of the agreement its security has strengthened and not lessened. In many ways I agree with what you have said about an infrastructure that was established in the seventies. I think that the agreement on reducing antimissile defenses signed in 1972 is extremely important, and we must ensure that in the next year or so it is not frustrated. President Reagan did not like the SALT II agreement which he inherited from President Carter. Until recently he did not exceed the boundaries of the limitations stipulated by the agreement, and I think that he can agree to adhere to the agreement in future, although the President has made a statement -- in incorrect one I think -- that he will break the agreement.

I do not agree with this. It is better not to revoke SALT II but to instead replace it with a new agreement on limiting strategic arms. But ideas really do differ, and various views exist. For example the United States accuses the USSR of violating certain provisions of the agreement while the Soviet Union accuses the United States of the same thing. We cannot appoint some kind of referee here like we do in football who could make a decision as to what is a violation and what is not. Both sides must come to an agreement.

I think that after General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan's meeting in Geneva, the world breathed a sigh of relief. Remember the fireside chat. What is the problem today? As far as I can understand it, in General Secretary Gorbachev's opinion, he

sees no great purpose in going to Washington if the talks there do not lead to substantial results, and I sympathize with this point of view. I think that the world also does not want another meeting devoted to a discussion of general topics. It awaits progress.

What do we have a right to expect by the end of this year? We expect that by the end of the year the entire process of talks and agreements will once again be set back on track. Not a single important agreement has been included since 1979. This is a long time.

[Zorin] Mr Owen, you have spoken about two approaches. Naturally two great powers cannot have one approach. I had in mind that in our nuclear age, stereotypes of pre-nuclear age thinking are not applicable. But we often collide with old stereotypes in this nuclear age. This is what I had in mind when I asked this question.

[Owen] I see, then I did not understand the question. I agree with you. Before the appearance of nuclear weapons, we thought about wars which could be won or lost. But after nuclear weapons appeared, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world came to realize that it had entered a period of a completely different type of war, wars in which there would be no victors. In the seventies and the beginning of the eighties there was a trend when the military on both sides and maybe especially on the Western side, started to discuss openly the possibility of winning the war. One of the results of the Palme Commission's work was the conclusion that there could be no victors in a nuclear war.

Both Gorbachev and Reagan came to the same conclusion at their meeting. And if everything settles down in its place and if all agree with the idea that there can be no victors in a nuclear war, then it follows that no such war should occur, and for this reason we should reduce nuclear armaments and create a climate for confidence so as to finally, and this may require a long time, completely get rid of them.

[Bahr] Allow me to make some additional remarks on this. This situation is fairly simple. Either we shall live in security together, or we shall die together. It is as simple as that. So the security we must strive for will not, I think, require changes in this or that society. Why do some prefer coffee and others tea? The main thing is to live in security.

So this would mean that we, striving for security, shall not demand that the other side change its social system. When your general secretary came to Geneva, it was not expected that he would praise the qualities of capitalism. Nor the other way around -- Reagan did not become a communist fellow-traveler by going to Geneva. The only thing mankind has the right to demand from the two great powers is that they ensure security. And for this there is a real need for new thinking. Because even after the two powers managed to work out important agreed-upon formulas in Geneva, we did not see them put into practice.

How can the words of agreements be turned into reality? For this purpose there is a need for a real change in policy. I cannot say that the Soviet Union has substantially changed its policy in this direction. I would like to see the West, instead of further testing new weapons, trying to test General Secretary Gorbachev about whether he will act in accordance with what he promised and said. That is all.

[Arbatov] I would like to add to this. You know, I think that it is fine that they admitted that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war and that it is not possible to win it. That amounts to admitting that it is better to live than die. And without any

hints, Egon, when a man is told that he must stop smoking in order to live, he does not always do that but continues to smoke. And here is the kind of picture we see in politics -- there is hardly anyone, I think, apart from some madmen, who thinks that there are people who deliberately have a plan in their safes for pressing a button at a given hour to begin a nuclear war.

It is important to take another step in the new thinking of the nuclear age, to understand that many forms of normal political behavior are now prohibited. They have become luxuries which we can no longer afford, like the arms race, the absence of a dialogue, regional conflicts which grow for years with no one undertaking any serious measures to liquidate them because of possible involvement in a war. That has happened in history more than once, completely against our will.

The main problem now is that the Geneva accord has been signed, and everybody knows that it is not possible to wage a nuclear war and to win it. But conclusions must be drawn from this and time is passing; it is working against us. It becomes more and more difficult to come to an agreement. Conclusions about our daily behavior must be made. We must have a firm guarantee for this.

[Falin] Allow me to add this. It is necessary to keep in mind that not only political declarations have an influence on military strategy and military construction. Military construction and especially the creation [sozdaniye] of new weapons systems has an influence on policy, political concepts about the other side, on all the political and other processes happening in the world. So for the declarations, however indisputable they are, to play a real role in consolidating peace and creating a firm and stable climate in the world, they must be followed by material and very precise steps. What Mr Owen has already said and what is included in the Salt I and Salt II treaties is extremely important, that is, outlining measures which are necessary in the military field not on the basis of national notions on security but on general notions of security. If each of the sides begins to build its military policy on the basis of how it understands its own security and the organization of security for others, then there can and there will be no agreement at all.

Now we have to take another step which we proposed at our last congress, to declare and establish as the basis of all our actions that today there are no problems, including the problem of security, that can be solved by military means. For this there is only one way -- political means, political agreements, the negotiation table.

[Zorin] I think that the new proposals concerning security in Europe outlined recently by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest bear a direct relation to the topic of our discussion. Mr Owen, what is your evaluation of these proposals? Do they, in your opinion, create a real possibility for improving European security?

[Owen] Yes, but I think that it is the first step. We have been holding talks in Vienna for 15 years. The issue concerns achieving reductions in central Europe, and I think that we are very close to agreement. Before we move to a much broader approach envisaged in the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals, I think we should achieve an agreement at the first stage in Vienna. After all, it will include an agreement on verification and inspection which would give both sides the confidence that the other is not violating the agreement.

We must be frank in this. The problem with these agreements is that up to now there has not been sufficient confidence in relations between states, and for this reason we must create very firm and reliable means and procedures for verification which

would make it possible for each side to be sure that the other side is not deceiving it. And if we reach agreement in Vienna, I think this will open the way toward much broader talks which will include a larger number of weapons systems and cover larger territories from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Personally, I think that it is very important to hold direct discussions between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It is time for them, instead of continuing to plan military actions against each other, to begin a dialogue with each other on the question of limiting the arms race and disarmament, which would cover conventional armaments as well as tactical nuclear weapons which though less powerful and with a more dangerous and may provoke a war more quickly.

[Zorin] You would like to say something?

[Bahr] I could subscribe to every word said by my friend David Owen. But I would like to go back for a second to the general situation. I think that since Gorbachev in January this year offered his program for the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons, we have demanded that this program be supplemented with a section on conventional armaments. We said that if the significance or the value of nuclear weapons is reduced, then consequently the significance of conventional armaments increases.

Now we have a whole package of Soviet proposals. I have to say that expanding the territory which is under discussion, -- at present it is from the Atlantic to the Urals -- also produced great satisfaction in the West. This was also demanded by Western Europe.

I also have to say that representing a country which does not possess nuclear weapons, I think our influence at the talks on these weapons between the two great powers is fairly limited. But we are interested in them and we have certain influence in issues relating to conventional armaments. We stick to the old position concerning nuclear weapons. We would like to get rid of them.

But now we are entering a stage in which Europe can play a special role and may even take a leading role in these talks. I also agree with David Owen in that these talks should be more focused on the real armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

Of course we should not neglect the other regions. The main problem is the central European region. It will have to be solved by way of creation of a relatively balanced situation between the two sides. We should not overlook the real danger, which is precisely in the central region. Therefore we shall have to combine the solution of central European problems with the problems concerning the whole of Europe.

[Arbatov] You see, that is correct. But I think that if we cross the bridge of the Vienna talks and think in that context about the proposals made by the Warsaw Pact, we unfortunately see that after 13 [as reads] years of talks in Vienna, the agreement is ready, it was ready long ago but has not been concluded, and if concluded it will only deal -- and this was said at our session -- with less than one percent of the armed forces. Therefore I think that these proposals are not just an expansion of the geographic region but also an impetus for new thinking, a new approach to the problems of security in central Europe, and that it is necessary to think on a considerably larger and more serious scale, and much more quickly, of course.

[Fallin] The last question is somewhat more complex. When Mr. Egon Bahr says that the FRG is not a nuclear power, but that is conditional. The proliferation of nuclear

weapons does not signify the emergence of new states possessing this type of weapons. Proliferation is also deployment of these nuclear weapons on foreign territory.

With respect to concentration of nuclear potential and nuclear weapons on FRG territory, you have to search for another regions in the world where there is a greater quantity of these weapons.

So the issue of the place of the FRG in the nuclear counterbalance is a debatable one. This does not diminish but on the contrary emphasizes the importance of the proposals that have been made, which expand our previous proposals. I shall remind you that some time ago, the Warsaw Pact countries offered to sign an agreement on the first use of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons in the zone of action of the final Helsinki act.

And now we offer a considerable, substantial, 25 or more percent reduction in armaments and armed forces, and the removal, from the regions where these reductions will take place, of not only separate units but combined forces in order to establish a balance of forces in Europe and thus establish a corresponding balance of forces in the world in many aspects.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, speaking in connection with President Mitterrand's visit, said that the Soviet side is ready, if we have a surplus in some aspects compared with NATO countries, to get rid of this surplus. We surmise that the same will be done by our Western partners. That will be a real balance, a reduction which will not damage the security of any side. We have not sought nor do we seek superiority. And you must start from this main premise in order to understand how sincere and how substantial our proposals are.

[Bahr] Could I make some remarks concerning what Valentin Falin has said? First of all, I find simply tragic the situation we have witnessed. If the USSR had made its current proposals concerning nuclear weapons let us say 5 years ago, my country and other West European countries would never have had cruise or Pershing missiles. That is a regrettable fact. I would like to say explicitly that the new Soviet position came late, but it really is an excellent position for beginning real talks. We are in a time of most responsible decisions.

There is another fact. What Gorbachev said during Mitterrand's visit to Moscow is actually very interesting and opens additional possibilities for discussion, talks. The matter is that we think that the Warsaw Pact has a certain superiority in conventional armaments. Gorbachev has said that he was ready to reduce this superiority to a level ensuring an approximate balance. Of course that includes the other side. If the West is quantitatively superior in some respect, it will also have to undertake reductions. That is really a good proposal, and I fully agree with it.

[Zorin] I would only say that what comes too late cannot be corrected.

[Arbatov] No, that is not the point. I think that memory is failing here somewhat. Although Egon has an excellent memory, it is failing him a little. Five years ago, in June 1981, we had no talks at all with the United States, no dealings at all.

[Falin interrupts] You mean 7 years ago. Egon has 7 years ago in mind.

[Arbatov] Yes. And this issue could not have been raised anywhere. The United States started from a very different premise.

[Bahr] Let us say 1982.

[Arbatov] I am sure that in 1982 some would have been found, as it has been found now, to reject the Soviet proposal. A way would have been found then. Arguing is the most fruitless thing. History does not accept any subjunctive mood. We cannot approach things this way.

[Owen] It was caused by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles in the seventies -- in the years 1977 and 1978. But I think more interesting is the question of why the United States needs nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union always found it difficult to understand that after 1945 some of our security was assured by the fact that the United States remained in Europe.

If the United States had removed its land-based missiles from Europe, you would have had to dismantle your land-based missiles over a large territory up to the Urals. We reached agreement on this issue.

The position of the USSR has been more accepting of the fact that France will keep nuclear weapons and Britain will also have nuclear weapons. They are small nuclear forces with minimal potential to deter. But their presence means that if the United States removes its land-based missiles, there will still be a certain number of missiles in Europe, which by no means are a counterbalance for Soviet weapons.

Nevertheless, they amount to a certain potential to deter and that means that there is a European element in it along with the Soviet one. We are more tolerant of the fact that you have a need for missiles in the Asiatic part of the USSR.

All these are changes which have occurred during the past year. We now have a better understanding of your concern with respect to Asia, whereas you understand the position of France and Britain and their concern about the possibility of complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. I think we shall reach agreement. It is possible that the agreement will not provide for the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. and Soviet missiles. This can be achieved in two stages. However, the present proposal is of great significance, and at first it provides for the removal of Pershing-2 missiles, leaving behind a small number of SS-20 and cruise missiles, and then in the second stage, completely reducing all the missiles.

If we agree with what Egon has pointed out and proceed with the reduction of missiles and nuclear warheads, we shall have to pay special attention to being certain about conventional armaments, so that no one can gain superiority in this respect. That lets me be more optimistic, if only we manage to convince political leaders and especially President Reagan to finally decide to hold talks. I do not think that we shall know about that before November or December this year. By that time it will become known whether President Reagan is ready to cross over the watershed and enter the age of arms limitations.

We would have never thought this possible with President Nixon. But he and President Brezhnev crossed this threshold in 1971, and I hope that the leaders will cross this threshold in 1986 and 1987.

[Arbatov] Nixon did not have Perle, or Weinberger, or many others.

[Owen] You all thought that Nixon and Kissinger were hawks before those agreements were signed. At that time, at the beginning of the seventies, the Vietnam war was in full swing and yet they arrived at an agreement. When Nixon came to power, hardly anyone could have thought that he would be the first president to sign a most important agreement on arms limitations with the USSR. I think that we cannot exclude the same possibility for President Reagan. President Reagan has the advantage that if he signs an agreement with the Soviet Union, he will manage to push it through Congress and achieve ratification. And that is one of the problems. The last 3 agreements have not been ratified by Congress.

[Arbatov] Frankly, I envy your optimism David, and would like to be infected with it. However, I recall that Nixon took some steps toward change in the first 2 years of his presidency, while Reagan has only 2 years left. Time is running out, and I would have liked to see some changes here, yet we must be realists even if we are optimists.

I would like to stress the other side, the fact -- that is what I thought came out of what Mr Owen said -- that everything depends on statesmen. Everything depends on the collection of ideas with which they come to power, the ideas they have about the other side and the requirements of the world; the ideas that arise in them in the process of realizing their power; and, naturally, what they want to do in practice and not simply say.

If we take the point of view expressed by Mr Owen, then I am prepared to agree. Where there is a will, the problems that face us today and determine the face of world today and tomorrow -- that is very important -- can be solved in a very short period of time -- in several rounds of talks.

[Arbatov interrupts] Not only can be, but possibly should be...

[Falin interrupts] It should be, that is another question...

[Arbatov interrupts] Because if it is delayed...

[Falin interrupts] Not only should it be, it can be.

[Arbatov] It cannot be delayed. Yes.

[Falin] Herein lies the essence. Mr Bahr knows how many decades the problems of West Berlin was mulled over and how much time was needed to solve this problem.

[Arbatov] What about the example of the partial nuclear test ban treaty? Two weeks -- even in the absence of the infrastructure about which you have spoken.

[Zorin] Now I would like us to touch on several problems. Therefore, I want to ask a question on a different topic. I would like to ask you, Mr Bahr, about your attitude toward Washington's doctrine of neoglobalism. Its application can be seen, for example, in relation to Nicaragua, Libya, Grenada. Are you not fearful that Washington can extend this doctrine to Europe?

[Bahr] This is a wonderful question. [laughs] First of all, let me start by saying that I did not come to Moscow to condemn our biggest ally. Having said this, I would like to note that during my visit to Washington 2 weeks ago I did not find a new doctrine there, but discovered that a struggle was underway between those that are called multilateralists. The latter consider that insofar as negotiations have not yielded any results

for so long and insofar as during this time the arms buildup has occurred much faster than negotiations on their limitation, and since the problem of verification has become increasingly more difficult, let us stop this nonsense and stop trying to achieve agreement.

Instead, they say, let us rely on something like mutual restraint, tacitly or openly. Then negotiations and even summit meetings can also be used, but in order to achieve understanding of how both sides would behave. This is that I think unilateralism is. I think it is directly contrary to the principle of common security, security for all, and I think that it will be very dangerous if this approach becomes doctrine in the United States. This has not occurred yet, but the struggle continues.

[Falin] Of course, it is very pleasing to hear what Egon Bahr has said -- that the struggle is still underway. But this struggle has several points and factors that we must take into consideration -- and this is the fact that this struggle is not occurring for the first time. After 1945 this struggle ended with the well-known position, which Baruch formulated as follows: It is of no consequence that we are not right -- it is important that we are strong.

I am not too sure that this struggle is in a process of ripening and that it is not already being reflected in certain military doctrines. For example, the United States' latest naval doctrine, published in January this year, contains the thesis that the United States is pursuing a policy of balancing on the brink of war on a global scale. This is recorded in a document. If this is so, and if this is maintained by the U.S. Navy chief of staff, then this is more than a discussion: It is a definite line of behavior and a definite direction of military construction. We should not regard this too frivolously.

Finally, we have spoken about Europe's position in these neoglobalist concepts of the United States and wondered if there are not certain dangers in connection with them. Now, we know from postwar U.S. doctrines that Europe is viewed as a line of forward defense. The question of forward defense or not forward defense is not simply a geographic concept -- it is not just a line along which troops are deployed. Forward defense is also a concept of anticipation, a concept of preventive strikes. As we can read in a number of U.S. documents of a certain period, which have now been declassified, this means the adoption of measures. They say that their advantages should be brought into play when the potential enemy still has no means for combatting these advantages. This too means a forward defense.

Therefore, this question is fairly complicated and has several cross sections -- it can be viewed both in the vertical and horizontal -- and there is no simple answer to it. In any case, everyone in Moscow would only applaud if the supporters of the creation of security on the basis of cooperation would take the upper hand in Washington.

[Owen] We could exchange documents both sides have in their possession. I could cite statements of Soviet admirals about building up the might and activities of the Soviet fleet throughout the world. I can show documents about Soviet military planning which create the impression there are plans for the use of nuclear weapons. But I do not think we will get very far with this. There are a variety of reasons for this. After all, the military on both sides are engaged in their military business. The position of the political leadership on the question of our relations is far more important.

I think that if we speak about Europe, then these relations are to a certain extent predetermined. We may not like the division of Europe that occurred as a result of war, but

in the broad sense of the word this fact has been accepted. We know what limitations exist and our attitude to events such as those that occurred in their time in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland is determined precisely by this.

A problem arises in other cases, like with Nicaragua, for example, a country the United States considers to fall within its sphere of interests. On this basis, the United States is pursuing a policy which is criticized by many, not only in the Soviet Union, but in the Third World and in other countries as well. In exactly the same way, you consider Afghanistan in your sphere of interest. Not only we, not only the West, but many other countries of the Third World believe that you have interfered in the affairs of Afghanistan. I believe that both the United States and the Soviet Union should admit that now a third voice can be heard in international affairs -- the voice of the nonaligned states.

And I do not think that the Third World, particularly the nonaligned world, will accept in the future this doctrine of spheres of influence extending directly beyond the traditionally and historically formed zones of the dominant influence of the United States or the Soviet Union. Therefore, I think a period of limitation of the superpowers will begin.

[Arbatov] That was the Sonnenfeldt doctrine.

[Owen] What?

[Arbatov] It was just the Sonnenfeldt doctrine. We never shared this view on division into spheres of influence. Never mind, go on please. [last three words spoken in English]

[Owen] You do it! For many years you have been interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan.

[Falín interrupts] This is another question.

[Owen] But you decided that you must defend your positions and you have used and continue to use Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The United States has adopted a similar position -- I do not share it -- that it has special interests in Nicaragua, and it is using its influence for destabilization, reckoning that thereby it is defending its interests as it perceives them there.

I believe that we must be very careful with this expansion of influence and this term sphere of influence. It should be forgotten. I agree that it has various meanings, but what is topical now is limitation of the influence of the superpowers beyond the boundaries of certain areas. In its policies or in its relations with the GDR, Hungary, and other countries, the European Community is elaborating a somewhat different position, a European position. It is taking shape slowly but the process is underway and in my opinion the world is becoming a more interesting place owing to it; and if Europe moves toward unity, it will have a very serious influence.

I do not think that the world will continue to be divided up where the role of the superpowers will be played by the United States and the Soviet Union. Both of these powers are finding that their influence is limited. And I welcome that [last sentence not translated into Russian]

[Arbatov] Yes, I think that we have no doubts over what you said last, that we are not omnipotent, we have no imperial plans. Generally we understand full well, it seems to

me, and this follows from all of our doctrine, which has been clearly expressed of late, in particular in all our doctrines, for example in the doctrine on security, universal security -- I am referring to documents of our congress.

But I would primarily like to comment on what you have said, David. You know, if you speak about our country, what we are talking about is related precisely to the struggle to overcome old thinking. You understand that occasionally one can look at the areas adjacent to the border [prigranichnyy rayon] -- this is natural and every country does this -- as an area of particular sensitivity, precisely out of considerations of security and particularly by a country that has suffered a lot and that has often seen this security threatened. The more we proceed toward this security for all and the more the fear of a threat decreases, the less a role such considerations will play.

And what happens in the United States and what Egon spoke about, that unilateralism -- I do not know how to translate it into Russian -- it is rather a kind of attribution to oneself of the right to act in the international arena proceeding exclusively from one's own interests and perceptions of one's interests without considering those of others.

In America it acquires a different character. So far it has been done fairly carefully and I could even say in a cowardly manner. So far the objectives were countries where the United States was not threatened with a loss of more than several dozen victims. That includes Grenada, Libya, Nicaragua, where mostly mercenaries have been used...

[Falín interrupts] In Lebanon.

[Arbatov] Yes. But further, well, Lebanon was precisely an example of this. When over 200 U.S. Marines perished, the Americans withdrew. The Vietnam syndrome is still present in the United States, and in America they fear a repetition of that situation.

But what is developing now worries me and I have understood that it also worries you. What has now begun in the form of an electoral doctrine with respect to three or four objectives is already acquiring a doctrinaire of conceptual form as a general political platform with respect to the entire surrounding world -- that you can do anything you like, anything you consider to be in your interests without considering others. And this is completely contrary to the concept of security for all to which this unilateralism is an antipode just like neoglobalism is the antipode of peaceful coexistence. It is taking the right to change the internal systems of countries where the systems do not suit you.

[Falín] Here there is another substantial point. First, the theory attributed to us of wanting to have a sphere of influence is wrong in its foundations. We do not want to have spheres of influence, we want to maintain normal and good relations with all countries and first of all, of course, with our neighbors.

Second, our aid to Afghanistan began in 1978, and armed aid in 1979, while armed intervention organized by the Americans in Afghanistan's affairs started in 1976 -- if you want to be precise and proceed from facts.

[Zorin] It is absolutely absurd to place Afghanistan and Nicaragua on the same board. In one case it is a matter of aid to a legal government against aggression and in the other it is aggression against the legal government.

[Falín] There is also a third point. We are ready at any moment to withdraw our contingent from Afghanistan.

[Arbatov interrupts] We are striving for that, we are ready for it, we are striving to withdraw.

[Falin] Essentially we have just one condition, an end to intervention from abroad. As for Nicaragua, the Americans actually stipulate their right to intervene in the affairs of this state in the future, according to the theory formulated by the Secretary of State Shultz after the U.S. attack on Grenada that the world after Grenada will never be what it was before Grenada. That is how it was put.

[Owen] Grenada is a small island to which the United States was invited by neighboring countries to put an end to internal insurrection.

[Arbatov] I think that the United States first asked the neighboring countries to ask it to go into that country.

[Falin] It was not case of call girl, but a call boy, in this case.

[Owen] Compared with Afghanistan it was on a completely different scale and in essence this is a problem different from Nicaragua. With regard to Nicaragua, the United States says in its defense that it is worried by Cuban influence. I am not defending the U.S. position with regard to Nicaragua and I hope that you will not defend the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan. We can understand why these problems have arisen. I agree with you that a problem arose for you. It all occurred on your border and I understand this problem. I do not believe that you were guided by offensive considerations with a desire to gain new territories. Speaking frankly, I think that you acted out of defensive considerations. But the fact remains that you are there. I only want to say that the nonaligned countries, not to mention Great Britain, West Germany, and others -- the nonaligned countries are criticizing the Soviet Union over its presence in Afghanistan, and the United States over intervention in Nicaragua. And we must listen to the non-aligned states of the Third World. I think that justice is on their side in both issues.

[Bahr] I think we should not argue too much about Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, and so forth. Let us return to your question. I hope that the West European countries will be sufficiently strong to oppose any manifestation of unilateralism by the U.S. side in Europe. I believe I have not voted for those leaders who now decide the question of my destiny as this relates to nuclear armaments. I really want to get rid of them. That will also mean a reduction of the potential threat presented to West European countries by conventional armaments and armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.

This is now the basis that was created by your general secretary. Let us begin talks on this group of questions. This may change the situation in Europe. Agreement in this sphere will retain its value even in case the two great powers do not achieve immediate results in their strategic arms talks.

[Zorin] When I read the statements of fairly many neoglobalism supporters in the United States, Mr Bahr, I remember one of your aphorisms which I like very much. You said once that stupidity does not become more attractive if it is displayed collectively.

[Bahr] Yes [laughs].

[Zorin] Mr Owen, I hope you will not complain about the question which I want to ask you. I know that you graduated with degrees in neurology and psychiatry at Cambridge University, is that so?

[Owen] Right.

[Zorin] In this connection, I would like to ask you about your attitude on the fear of the Soviet threat being fanned by certain circles.

[Owen] I think that the West could never understand what a shock World War II was for the Soviet people, for their consciousness, and the influence on them of the great losses suffered by your country. Few realize when they travel from the airport to Moscow, that the German troops had been in the very outskirts of the Soviet capital, and I think that all this has had additional influence on and has even increased the historic tendencies of the Soviet military to over insure themselves, to create a surplus while striving to ensure security. I think that you were always inclined to take a pessimistic point of view. And you, too, Georgiy, give an example of this, particularly in this discussion.

So, I shall not exaggerate too much by saying that you have created very large land forces, and that you have a considerable amount of equipment, many more tanks than we have for example. It does not follow from this that you are threatening us or want war. Personally, I do not think there is any serious likelihood of attack, incursion, or war in Europe. I think that we have reached a certain level of understanding.

I think that relaxation of tension has never meant that the ideological struggle between communism and the Western democracies would be stopped. What we wanted to achieve was putting order in our relations. I think that this has been done but to a far from sufficient extent. This is why I do not think the Soviet Union presents a threat as an aggressive military force. But like you, I want to be vigilant but preferably at a much lower level of conventional and nuclear forces. I do not think that you intend to attack us. I do not think that you are planning a threat or an attack. I think that those who in the West speak about the USSR in the language of these notions are in the minority. I do not think that they represent the view of the majority in the Western community. And when they speak in this manner, they themselves become the objects of gibes. That does not mean at all that we must not be vigilant. We are well aware that we have different ideologies and that you strive to spread communist ideology. But I do not think that you have the intention of spreading it with the aid of armed aggression. I do not think that at all.

[Arbatov] I have had no training in psychiatry or neurology and therefore I find it more difficult to judge the state of the minds of others, but I find it strange that in the West they did not understand why the Soviet Union was forced to pay such attention to its defense after the war. Take the U.S. nuclear monopoly, for instance. I do not want to repeat the entire history, our version of the beginning of the cold war and compare it with your version. It was nevertheless a reality which I remember very well as a fully aware man. During the first postwar years we really felt the great threat from those who had been our allies which we had not expected and which disappointed us.

Now we must not think about the past. I hope that you, as a politician as well as a neurologist and psychiatrist, can link the two and invent ways to overcome these psychological barriers and open the way for new thinking in order to understand that all this talk about the threat, all this is mad hatter's talk -- if we use the

language of English classics and "Alice in Wonderland". This is not possible now. Europe cannot allow a conventional war, let alone a nuclear war. We must move away from this and think about something very different. There are other tasks.

Most of the time we waste time in political dialogue, unfortunately, on problems of yesterday, although the problems of today and tomorrow -- European world, and national problems in every country -- are growing threateningly around us. It is important to achieve a change here. Therefore, it is necessary to drop the burden of old thinking, of old doctrines, old policies, the old type of foreign political behavior and the old system in international relations.

[Falin] There is a paradox that should not be overlooked. They always feared us, during the 20th century at least, and we always got hit. We always overarmed ourselves before a war, and until we reached the Volga we did not realize that we had not overarmed ourselves.

[Arbatov interrupts] Until the Germans reached the Volga.

[Falin] Yes. After the war we were forced to rearm to make it more difficult to rebuild the economy. But they said we were rearming and threatening. Here we must someday find the same watershed which we are seeking now in other issues between the true and the false. When we find it it will be easier to understand each other.

[Zorin] I would like to ask our guests the following question: Currently European political circles are discussing the destiny of the SALT treaty. Mr Owen, what is your point of view on the issue?

[Owen] I think that the limitations imposed by SALT II were very significant and that they must be preserved. I think that this treaty aroused some disappointment as it provided for further growth without ensuring reduction of existing armaments. I would be very glad if we could now reach an agreement on reduction of strategic armaments, and would not object to abandoning SALT II in this case, as it would simply be incorporated in the new agreement. I think that President Reagan would display wisdom if he did not violate the limitations imposed by the agreement before a new agreement is worked out. It should not be abandoned at the present stage and I hope that he will not do that. I think that Congress, the Democratic and Republican senators, will put serious pressure on him to observe the limitations imposed by that agreement.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr, considering that you said that you did not come to Moscow to condemn your allies, nevertheless I would like to ask you about your attitude toward statements by U.S. leaders who have said they want to abandon the SALT II treaty.

[Bahr] I share the view expressed by David Owen. I can only add that all the arguments expressed by our U.S. allies in favor of abandoning SALT II failed to convince a single NATO foreign minister, including those who represent very conservative governments. Thus, for the first time in the history of the bloc, we were faced with the fact that all the other members came out with criticisms of the statement made by Reagan to the effect that he will no longer consider himself bound by the SALT II treaty conditions as this will lead to an unlimited strategic arms race.

[Falin] I think there is an important moment or two here. The first is that the SALT II treaty was not just a treaty limitation. It was also a treaty on reducing strategic armaments. Had the treaty been ratified, the strategic forces would have been reduced substantially, by over 10 percent. That would have been a first step toward a more

serious reduction which was to be negotiated within the framework of SALT III. The second point is what is no longer mentioned now but what was mentioned by Adelman 2-3 years ago. Less was said then about so-called violations of the treaty with the Soviet Union and more was said about the fallacious principles at the basis of the treaty. In a message to the Senate, Adelman said that the main reason for our not ratifying the treaty is not that we do not want to extend it, but that we do not want to make the principles of the treaty a law of the United States. And the basis of the treaty has as its main principle equality and equal security.

[Zorin] I would like to touch on another topic and my question is for you, Valentin Mikhaylovich. I would like you to answer this question in the presence of Mr Bahr. You are a well-known specialist on problems connected with the FRG and a former Soviet ambassador to that country. I would like to ask you what has been happening lately with that country's policy.

[Falin] There is much happening with that country's policy. That country's policy is looking predominantly to the past and not the future. A look back does not always prevent us from seeing what is facing us, though it unnecessarily reminds us about what has happened in the past.

I think that some of the things we recognized, that both sides recognized as necessary and essential in the seventies, have been forgotten. More precisely, this was to avoid actions that could threaten the interests of both sides, to understand ourselves as part of something more substantially common, such as all-European security. Today we hear arguments to the effect that regardless of whether it is advantageous to the Soviet side, it is advantageous to the security of Western Europe. This is what we object to categorically. What may be advantageous to us can be rejected by us without any prompting from your Western side if only because a decrease in security for the United States in Western Europe would mean at the same time a decreased security for the Soviet Union and our friends.

I think the maintenance of mutually advantageous economic relations has become considerably more difficult, particularly because there is more discrimination in these relations and more preconditions set by the Western side. There is a whole series of other points which should not be dramatized possibly, but which are unfortunately circumstances impossible to bypass.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr, there is no need for you to speak against your allies here, but I would like to hear your opinion on this topic.

[Bahr] Ha, you know I can make it rather short. I have every reason, as has my party, to strive to replace the present government. One of the main reasons lies in the fact that we are convinced that a new round of Ostpolitik, as we call it, is necessary, a new round in the policy of detente. We would like to affirm a long-term trend in politics the result of which would be a situation in which not a single state could attack one country from another, in which not a single country would be capable of beginning an attack, particularly with the aid of conventional weapons. As far as nuclear arms are concerned I (?would not) have a say.

At the same time it is essential that we establish economic cooperation that would serve as an additional support in the common interests of maintaining this economic cooperation so that we could say, let the next generation solve the remaining problems.

[Zorin] I would like to continue this topic and ask you, Mr Owen, what has happened recently in British politics? To be frank, I would like to say that personally, as an independent factor, I have been unable to fathom this British policy of late.

[Owen] I think that Britain is a very close friend of the United States and this is conditioned by the historic development of our countries. Of course I would not overestimate the significance of the slow shift that is occurring in Britain since its entry into the European Community. We did this late, only in 1973, but if you continue to look at Britain as a country linked only to the United States and not with Europe, then I think you have missed a fairly important and substantial change.

With every year, Britain is becoming an increasingly European power although it continues to preserve, and I hope it will continue to preserve, close and friendly relations with the United States.

But we increasingly understand that as a result of the fact that our empire has disappeared, that our former colonies have received independence, that our economic positions have weakened, that our country can preserve its influence only as a European power if it plays a more important role in Europe. That is why I attach so much significance to relations in the sphere of defense and nuclear arms between France, Britain, and Germany.

I believe a strong, unified, and democratic Europe, which is somewhat more confident in itself and in its relations with the United States, will increasingly correspond with the interests of the Soviet Union. We do not intend to reject the United States. Not one of us wants this, and this will not happen. But I believe a more genuinely purely European point of view will emerge and in step with the emergence of this European point of view, it is quite natural that insofar as we are all European and live on the one continent we will share identical views on some issues with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

For example, I have no reason to defend our prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, for just like Egon, I hope that at the next elections we will come to power and form our government. She is often depicted as a very close friend of President Reagan. But when the question arose of applying sanctions and ending cooperation in the sphere of construction of the gas pipeline, which is of great significance to you and to Eastern Europe, we refused to follow the U.S. course. This was an incorrect course, the introduction of sanctions was a mistake, and we refused to do this.

You must not think that Britain is simply and completely in the United States' pocket. There have been instances when I think we adopted wrong decisions. I think that Britain made a wrong decision on the Libyan issue, which I think is a controversial issue. If you consider yourself a friend and an ally, you must be ready to support the actions of your ally even if you do not agree with him. It must be done from time to time.

You do the same with regard to your allies. Thus, I can say that at times, I get the impression that the Soviet Union is striving to break Europe from the United States. You want to split us up. I think this is a fruitless effort. We cannot be broken away from the United States. It is far more important that you encourage dialogue between our countries so that Western Europe becomes more confident in itself and in its relations with the United States and becomes more united. The greater our unity, the more influence we will have and the more influence we can exert on the United States. That may be immodest on my part but I think this influence will also be beneficial for the United States.

[Arbatov] I would like to object, however. There may be philistines among us who think that way...

[Zorin interrupts] We are realists.

[Arbatov] Who thinks of splitting Europe from its ally, the United States? We do not set such a goal, first of all, because we are realists and understand this is impossible, and second, because we want to have good and normal relations with both Western Europe and the United States. We do not think that a bloc policy of pulling the weight this way and not giving the weight to the other side of these scales can change anything. That is not the way to solve world problems. So we are not for splitting your alliance but for seeing that alliance conducting a proper policy. If that does happen, please be friendly with the United States. [as heard]

[Falin] Georgiy Arkadyevich, there is a very important point in David Owen's statement, precisely that in conditions of detente and normal relations the weight of states, large ones like England and smaller ones, normally grows.

The countries gain additional possibilities for self-expression, for representing and promoting their interests. In this sense the weight of the military factor created or not created by the superpowers is leveled out. That is a very important point.

[Arbatov] This situation of tension is a kind of state of emergency in which no one has the right to act according to his wishes.

[Zorin] In as much as our time is drawing to a close, I would like to offer each of the participants 2 minutes to answer the question about how you view prospects for the development of the political process. Let us begin with you, Valentin Mikhaylovich.

[Falin] The prospects will depend on what we do this year and the beginning of next year. I want to believe, I may have no justification for that, yet I would like to believe that we shall consider not only what is correct today but what will also be correct for the next generation. We must not deprive that generation by handing over problems, thinking that generation will be wiser and will solve them; it may be wiser than we are but it will be deprived of the possibility of solving them because we will create conditions for not solving them.

[Zorin] Mr. Owen.

[Owen] I think the current year is a watershed year, and it is very important that the United States and the USSR hold a meeting. I think the personalities of these two leaders, Gorbachev and Reagan -- I have met them both -- and am convinced that the personality factor is of great significance. So I consider it important that they meet. It is very important that they lay the foundations for progress. I think Europe can exert its influence. East European countries will be able to influence the Soviet Union, its position at the talks, so that at times it will display more flexibility. I think the West European democracies can exert a beneficial effect on the United States and convince it to go to the conference table to reach a concrete agreement and concrete treaties. We should use our influence. If we do that, it is possible that by 1987 we will again return to regulated relations between our countries.

In the meantime, I think exchanges of views, discussions on controversial issues, will be of great significance. We have discussed many controversial problems at this table like Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and others. I think this kind of dialogue between our countries will reach millions of people, increases mutual understanding, and strengthen confidence; and that is the basis of general security.

[Zorin] Mr Bahr.

[Bahr] We are on one globe. Nevertheless, Chernobyl has shown that we can live either in conditions of common danger or in conditions of common security. It has shown that our common European home does in fact exist. Let us unite our efforts to develop European security. This will also be very good for the rest of the planet.

[Arbatov] I have already been accused of pessimism. I would say that I think that a difficult period awaits us, an uneasy time and that very radical changes, very radical changes are needed. Our enemies are not just those who do not want these changes. Our enemies are, [changes thought] working against us is the force of many centuries of tradition, even thousands of years of habits and traditions and the inertia of all those thousands of years when these questions were solved by war and the force of war. This must be overcome.

Nevertheless this is incredibly difficult and very complex. Mankind has never solved this kind of task and on the other hand never has such a danger hung over it nor has such an objective situation pressed it to solve this task. I think that this will be no easy task, but regardless of how difficult it is, we simply have no right to avoid solving it.

This task is on the agenda of history and we cannot accept no as an answer. It must be solved and I would like to conclude with the words of a great English materialist -- you see how I have refreshed my memory in your honor David -- Francis Bacon, who said that man must not only seek opportunities, he must create them. I think that we, the Soviet Union, has tried to do this during the past year, and we have done so most actively.

[Zorin] Well, it remains for me to thank the participants in our interesting discussion and to express the hope that this is not our last meeting here in our Studio 9, and to thank our television viewers for their attention. And so, until our next meeting in Studio 9, thank you.

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5 August 1986

SALT/START ISSUES

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FRG PAPERS DISCUSS U.S. THREAT TO ABANDON SALT II

Europeans Exaggerated Treaty's Importance

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 3 Jun 86 p 4

[Editorial by Josef Joffe: "Arms Without Limitations?"]

[Text] SALT II is not for burning, LE MONDE says, because this arms control treaty "after all has the merit of existing," and there is nothing better. The famous French newspaper thereby reflects an opinion that may justly be considered the classic European view. Since 1972, when Nixon and Brezhnev signed the first SALT Treaty, West Europeans have viewed the SALT framework as the actual pledge of detente--all the more as the crises of the past 10 years have swept away almost all other pillars of the detente between the superpowers. Ronald Reagan's opinion--asserted since the 1980 election campaign--that SALT II was marred by a "deadly flaw"--has never been shared by the Western allies. However, as long as President (in contrast to candidate) Reagan kept to the never ratified treaty, the potential crisis remained latent.

No sooner, though, did Reagan indicate last week that he might disregard SALT II ceilings by year's end, when the crisis turned into a noisy quarrel. Secretary of State Shultz was compelled to listen to "biting remarks" at the NATO spring meeting in Halifax, and his German colleague Genscher merely transmuted the group rebuke into diplomatically polite terms when he announced his hope that this was not going to Washington's "last word."

It is very well understandable that the Europeans always assigned greater political importance to the SALT process than either of the two superpowers. Even in the darkest moments of the Second Cold War, SALT appeared to the Europeans like a lighthouse in the dark, a glimmer of hope and signpost but, most of all, a symbol permitting them to legitimately cultivate their European detente garden and, at the same time, daily admonish the two giants to at last return to the old order of business. On the other hand, SALT served as a guidelight of detente between Washington and Moscow only as long as their general political business flourished. SALT was not the cause but the reflection of the wish to mutual understanding and, when that wish began to drain away in the various crises of the Third World--from Angola to Afghanistan--, SALT, too, ran out of steam. SALT has been fighting a coma for

the past 7 years. First Reagan was unwilling to negotiate, later--in 1983--the Russians broke off talks in retaliation against arms modernization. At present even Gorbachev's most daring disarmament offers are unable to disguise the fact that his negotiators in Geneva have not really diverged from their old established positions.

If, therefore, SALT is a reflection rather than the motive force of politics (and matters between the superpowers are certainly not at their best), the question of the actual operation of the treaty urgently moves to the fore: Has SALT II served to hold back armament, or even act as the engine of disarmament? The answer is bound to be both yes and no. Both parties have lately chiseled off bits and pieces--admittedly only to advance the modernization of their arsenals without breaking through the various ceilings and intermediate ceilings of the SALT structure. They disarm to rearm. The Russians scrapped obsolete rockets, replacing them with modern and very precise missiles. Ronald Reagan retired Poseidon submarines, taking Trident type submarines into service instead--the latter having more missiles with more warheads on board. Both parties are rushing along work on exotic antiballistic missile systems such as the SDI, and by developing more and more precise missiles, they are both moving toward a first strike capacity that weakens stability.

Even the most detente ready Europeans should--like Ronald Reagan--therefore ask themselves whether the SALT process may not be actually "obsolete." SALT II has not managed to reduce the arsenals; at the same time the precision and, consequently, the threat of weapons has risen year by year on both sides. Another question mark hangs over Soviet violations of the treaty. The Americans may well exaggerate some of them. Nevertheless, Western disarmament experts--even opponents of Ronald Reagan--increasingly agree that the Russians have forcefully exploited the imprecisions of the treaty. They built two new missile systems though only one is permitted in SALT II: The large-scale radar at Krasnoyarsk looks like the centerpiece of a future (forbidden) antimissile system; the encoding of the data beamed back from missile tests prevents verification by the Americans, though this is expressly stipulated in SALT II.

Nevertheless Reagan's announcement of the possible abrogation of SALT II raises another and no less important issue: His threats of breaking through the SALT barriers from the end of this year on are surely intended to pressure the Russians to have the general secretary's words followed by deeds in Geneva. Almost nothing has moved there since March 1985, when the talks resumed. Maybe the logjam will loosen, but it is also possible that the dam will break altogether. And Reagan surely knows that the Soviet Union would be able in a far shorter time to produce a lot more strategic weapons than the United States.

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 19 Jun 86 p 1

[Editorial by Guenther Gillesen: "An Empty Symbol"]

[Text] These days, when we listen to some German politicians tensely discussing the latest Soviet disarmament proposals and Washington's rejection of SALT II, we might think that we are for the last time confronted with the choice whether there will be any more attempts at disarmament or whether the switches will be set for a mad ride toward unlimited conflicts, beginning with an "unrestricted arms race."

Such alarmist talk is current not only in the camp led by Willy Brandt, where Soviet proposals generally enjoy a better reception than American suggestions. Foreign Minister Genscher and other FDP politicians, too, are making similar remarks. Following the death of deputies Marx and Mertes, hypercritical views about American policy are current even in the CDU. Deputy Ruehe's verdicts, for example, hardly differ from the Federal Foreign Minister's elegant and finely measured doubts about the direction of U.S. policy.

It is striking that the Union is moving with increasing uncertainty in a field that once, in the first 20 years of the Federal Republic, was their strong point next to economic policy. Washington's critics hardly notice that the actual policies of the U.S. President is decided far more by moderation than seems indicated by his public statements.

There is no reason to assume that the end of disarmament has arrived. Such a view would substantially overestimate the importance of SALT II and underestimate the reasons motivating the two superpowers to pursue arms control. These reasons did not end with SALT II. Instead SALT died because it was a defective treaty right from the start. It did not make possible the breakthrough to balanced disarmament (that possibility had motivated the Americans to invent SALT 20 years ago). This is why the U.S. Senate (no less ready for disarmament than the Bundestag in Bonn or any other Western parliament, all of whom would prefer to spend money on consumption and social welfare rather than on defense) did not permit President Carter to ratify the treaty. The treaty dealt with the periphery, the quantity of launchers and launcher racks. It was full of holes with respect to the actual weapons--the warheads.

Moreover, in the following years the Soviet Union violated some provisions intended to act as brakes, including the provision that data about missiles in test flights must not be encoded and another one stipulating that no party should test and take into service more than one new long-range missile. Instead the Soviet Union produced two new missiles, the SS 24 and SS 25, and tried to represent the development of the SS 25 as the permitted modernization of an older type. Washington did not accept this claim, because a missile with a doubled missile weight should be considered a new development. At the same time the Soviet Union even failed to reduce (as prescribed) the existing launcher systems from 2,500 to 2,250. The Americans considered the Soviet

Union's compliance with the SALT II provisions the basis for their promise to continue for the time being to respect the provisions of the unratified treaty.

President Reagan's decision means neither the end of efforts at Geneva for extensive and balanced disarmament, nor does it signal any U.S. advance toward a radical increase in strategic arms. Initially it merely means that Washington reserves to itself the right to decisionmaking, in particular with respect to shifts in its own arsenal. Even if (and that is not likely) America should exceed the SALT II ceilings with regard to the numbers of launcher systems, that need not necessarily imply more weapons (warheads). Everything evidently depends on the future behavior of the Soviet Union.

The Americans are no more interested than the Europeans to incite the Soviet Union to increase its arms. Unfortunately the Soviet Union does not need any incitement. Nor is it necessary to persuade it of the desirability of disarmament. Instead it is very desirable indeed to persuade it that disarmament is possible for the West only in conditions of greater balance, equality and efficient verification. Unilateral or symbolic acts are simply not good enough. The fact that Western politicians have tended to assign confessional value to SALT II has contributed to the general confusion. An inadequate treaty would be the symbol of an ideal that it definitely fails to meet.

In fact, the conflict between European politicians who hold such high expectations of SALT II and the Americans concerns quite another issue: Whether a facade of disarmament is to be viewed as the semblance or the beginning of disarmament; whether SALT II--a ruin or even a Potemkin village of disarmament--merits to be conserved, or whether it would be better to dismantle the stage set and thereby indicate to the other party that outward manifestations are no longer enough. It is quite possible that a clear cut statement of Western disinterest in insubstantial solutions such as SALT II may motivate Moscow to negotiate more seriously, because it could no longer expect unilateral benefits from America. That is something the European critics of Reagan's decision should certainly bear in mind.

Superpowers Must Build Trust

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 29 May 86 p 1

[Editorial by J.B.: "The Miracle of SALT II"]

[Text] The treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (SALT II), concluded in 1979 by the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, will always keep a special place in the history of international treaties. The treaty never took effect. Its agreed term ended on 31 December 1985. Nevertheless both parties still maintain that they are complying with the treaty. Even the U.S. announcement that it will probably no longer feel bound by it from next fall on conforms to the treaty, because the first respective U.S. notification occurred 6 months before the due date--exactly the period of time the treaty grants each party the right to unilaterally withdraw from it by reason of higher national interests.

The amazing regulatory effect of a treaty that in fact does not exist in international law arises from a definitely positive motivation on both sides: The treaty fixes a ceiling for all strategic offensive weapons. At first nobody was inclined to question this, because to do so would have meant a superfluous and expensive race in terms of numbers but without significance for mutual nuclear deterrence.

However, the treaty goes beyond the setting of a ceiling for the offensive weapons permitted both sides. It consists of a plethora of individual provisions designed to regulate the ratio of the various categories of weapons systems developed up to 1979 and varying considerably on both sides. While there does seem to be some confidence with regard to the absence of violations of the stipulated ceilings, confidence in the actual observance of these many individual provisions has been severely impaired. The overall system has been badly shaken up by the development of new weapons systems and their testing, the inability to properly verify technical breakthroughs by one or the other party, the secrecy about data that, according to the text of the treaty, ought not to be encoded. By now these uncertainties are also affecting the ceilings agreed in 1979 for the weapons systems to be classified as strategic. I would mention in passing that the Soviet development of medium-range missiles type SS 20 and NATO arms modernization severely taxed SALT II. Both of them rate between the missiles with a range of 5,500 km--classified as strategic--and the bombers equipped with cruise missiles and having a range of more than 600 km.

The most important factor in the slow erosion of the treaty, though, is to be found elsewhere. The fact that it never formally took effect--it was not ratified by the U.S. Senate--was due to the loss of confidence between the superpowers following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In these circumstances we would now have to account it miraculous that both parties nevertheless continued to respect the treaty. After all, compliance with so many and complex individual provisions presumes confidence, because they are not really verifiable despite surveillance from space. However, such confidence is bound to be progressively eroded if the unratified treaty is not replaced by new and verifiable agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. And that has not happened so far.

That is why basically nothing is achieved by the appeals to both parties to keep on feeling bound by SALT II--appeals joined also by the Federal German Chancellor for domestic political-propagandist reasons.

If SALT II, that unique phenomenon in the history of treaties, had any political meaning at all, it must very soon be followed by new arms agreements between the superpowers, of a relatively simple and verifiable nature. A treaty on the reduction of earlier ceilings for strategic arms--leaving the two superpowers free to choose launcher systems, ballistic or nonballistic missiles, land or seaborne weapons--would be one possibility. President Reagan's announcement that the United States may soon cease to keep to SALT II should therefore be interpreted also as a challenge to the Soviet Union to as soon as possible join in new agreements on strategic offensive weapons. Of course the Soviet Union is bound to describe this as inadmissible pressure on its negotiating position. However, there is also such a thing as the pressure

of facts--the need to replace a virtually nonexistent treaty by a proper agreement. To quote a Jewish proverb: A billy goat has a beard but that does not make it a rabbi.

Soviets Respond to Pressure

JPRS-TAC-86-062
5 August 1986

Bonn DIE WELT in German 9 Jun 86 p 2

[Article by Fritz Wirth: "How Reagan's Salt Decision Is Misunderstood"]

[Text] President Reagan's contested decision to no longer feel it necessary to stick to the numerical limits of SALT II has military and political aspects. In the long term, the latter are more important than the first.

Those who project the threat of a new flood of missiles should be reminded that--disregarding the possibility of a technical defect--a nuclear war is highly unlikely to be brought about by an unduly large quantity of nuclear weapons. The quantity of nuclear missiles has long exceeded all bounds of necessity. If at all, a nuclear war will happen only as the result of crises, misunderstandings, short circuits or miscalculations.

The central question in the SALT dispute should therefore be this: What will be the effect of Reagan's decision on U.S.-Soviet relations? The basic principle of this treaty is reciprocal restraint with respect to nuclear arms. Nobody doubts, nor does anybody outside the Soviet Union dispute the fact that Moscow has violated this principle for many years.

Nevertheless President Reagan's SALT decision has not abandoned the principle of nuclear restraint. For the time being he has canceled only the numerical ceilings of this treaty. "SALT free," America intends to adapt its defense to the security needs forced upon it by the Soviets.

In other words, the U.S.A. will adjust its arms production to the extent that the Soviets may in future violate control agreements. Those who accuse the Reagan Administration of stimulating a nuclear arms race are therefore addressing the wrong party. The Soviets alone will decide the start and intensity of a new arms race.

The Administration in Washington has amazed by the imputation that Reagan's SALT decision had given the green light for the nuclear arms race. It feels that it has been made the scapegoat, while the Soviet treaty violators are spared any reproach.

Much anger was aroused in particular by the accusation that Washington's foreign and defense policy has adopted a "unilateralist line" and autocratically "uncoupled" the allies. The Reagan Administration points out that consultations with the allies have never been closer and more intensive than since the start of the Geneva disarmament negotiations in March 1985.

We also need to remember that there is not a single member of the Reagan Administration, who mentions abandoning Europe or troop withdrawals from the

NATO region as the result of annoyance with the Europeans in the Libyan or SALT affairs. They know that to do so would amount to the United States shooting itself in the foot. Nevertheless, displeasure with the Europeans is growing outside the Administration--in the Congress, the media, men such as Henry Kissinger and the man in the street.

Considerable political pressure is building in this connection, and it remains to be seen how long the Administration will be able to resist such pressures. This will be an even more pressing question if governments should arise in London and Bonn, who promise confrontation in many spheres, above all in arms issues.

There remains the question of the effects of the SALT decision on future Washington-Moscow relations. The Reagan Administration noted with great attention that, disregarding the customary propaganda rhetoric, Moscow's response was considerably milder than some critics had forecast.

Washington does not consider that the summit with Gorbachev is in any danger. The Soviets need a dialogue, because their long-term interest in arms control agreements is greater than that of the Americans. After all, such treaties have so far always enabled them to effectively shield the modernization and stockpiling of their missile arsenals.

It is surely not coincidental that, instead of massive criticism of Reagan's SALT decision, they submitted new proposals in Geneva just a few days later, designed to extend the term of the ABM Treaty. This shows that Moscow has well understood the real and relevant signals of the American SALT decision, because the American side obviously has more in mind than the revision of the SALT Treaty. At stake here are the benefits and effectiveness of an entire network of treaties with the Soviets, that had become fragile and anachronistic. The ABM Treaty--for the U.S.A. the key to its SDI program--will be the central issue. The Europeans should prepare for this topic.

Europeans Must Recognize Realities

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 7 Jun 86 p 1

[Article by Thomas Kielinger: "Some Just Talk, the Others Act"]

[Text] The Atlantic Alliance is not suffering from Libya. Nor is it suffering from the spuriousness of an arms control treaty with the name of SALT II. The Atlantic Alliance does not suffer from American unilateralism, just as it does not suffer from European impotence. All these are secondary manifestations that merely indicate the primary imbalance at the core of this almost 40-year old alliance: The allies do not share the same competence for answering the respective fundamental questions--if they ever raise them. That, for its part, is the result of unequally distributed responsibilities and duties within the Western alliance. Some examples:

Europeans need not join in watching--in fact are technologically incapable of doing so--what kind of radar facility is under construction in the Siberian

region of Krasnoyarsk, and what consequences might arise therefrom for the validity of the ABM Treaty concluded in 1972. They need not watch--nor are they technologically equipped to do so--how the Soviets "telemetrically" encode the decisive flight data of tests of new missiles. They need not worry whether the encoding of these data might yield Soviet advances in the development of new missiles--banned by the 1979 SALT treaty. SS 24 and SS 25--as far as Europe is concerned, that is at best an academic discussion.

This is evident, for example, by the fact that the European chancelleries, these wonderful fortresses of experienced diplomacy, did not once plainly and audibly as well as realistically point out to and thereby diplomatically enlighten the Soviet Union or Soviet allies as to what would necessarily happen if one party were to as resolutely undermine the strategic 1979 treaty as Moscow has been freely doing for at least the past 4 years. If we were responsibly involved as powers participating in the treaty, if we had the duty and capacity in the name of our security to review the basis of such treaties and by diplomatic channels insist on compliance--then the United States would have European partners who might be said to be co-equals, equals among equals, and together they would share the burdens of consequences of their responsibilities on the stage of history.

Instead we have the great looking away. On three occasions since early 1984, the White House submitted detailed evidence of Soviet contract violations--the last time on 23 December 1985. In June 1985, the NATO Council of Ministers' meeting in Lisbon explicitly discussed the problem of compliance (or its opposite) with the arms control treaties. Six weeks ago chief disarmament counsel Paul Nitze visited the allied capitals and warned the allies that a step such as that taken by President Reagan was bound to be inevitable unless Moscow were at some time to start respecting the terms of the arms control treaties.

We were consulted but did not ourselves analyse the changes that called for a political response. Consequently we were not prepared for Reagan's SALT II abrogation of 27 May, because Europe is dominated by the expectation that the status quo is going to continue guaranteeing a reliable basis for our stability. All this has serious consequences for the alliance, because it offloads on the transatlantic partner in Washington alone the necessity of the perception and the subsequently required decisionmaking. The partner feels the reflex of the Europeans to always try to curb him when a decision is needed. Unfortunately he does not note any solidarity arising from responsible strategic analyses. In so far the SALT II quarrel logically fits in with the earlier dissension about Libya.

Admittedly, if our assumption is correct and the alliance characterized by different historical readiness, different competence for responding to crises, the Americans will not be served by just complaining about their isolation. In that case they are in fact isolated--and they will act accordingly. We have now arrived at this point in time. Speaking this week after an SPD Presidium meeting, Willy Brandt was quite right to complain about the "decline of European influence in the Atlantic Alliance." However, his accurate

description of the present situation was not followed by a detailed explanation of the reasons of this decline. Such an explanation is still outstanding.

It would have to mention our odd attitude in terms of international law: We preach observance of treaties after their term has in fact expired instead of concerning ourselves with the credibility of the negotiated provisions. Not for nothing did the signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty provide for 3 months' notice of withdrawal. Not for nothing did Washington and Moscow agree on a possible 6 months' notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Not for nothing do treaties have a definite term. SALT II expired end December 1985 and was not even ratified by the U.S. Senate.

All this surely signifies that the long suffering documents must constantly be reviewed in the light of security requirements. To recommend to one treaty partner (the United States in the case of SALT) that it should hold sacred against its better judgement a treaty never or no longer valid in international law, while the Soviets resolutely undermine it or exploit the blurred margins of the treaty texts up to and including the loss of all credibility--such a recommendation disavows the quality of our counsel and indeed destroys our influence in Washington.

These events are a very welcome lesson for Moscow. The Kremlin is bound to conclude that it is more profitable to harass Washington by the European lever than to submit substantial proposals at the negotiating table in Geneva. After all, the Soviets have already "consumed" their own treaty violations, and they may well hope to wring more concessions from their partner via the European allies. In one word: The poorest possible prospects for disarmament.

Still, this does not mean that we will be promptly confronted with a new and dramatic surge in the arms race. Neither of the two superpowers has the least interest in doing so. In fact, Reagan's announcement of increasing the American cruise missile equipped bomber fleet represents a temperate and moderate reply to the unchecked increase in the Soviet ballistic potential. Gorbachev's actual answer will, we hope, finally provide a clue to his real readiness for cooperation and accommodation. His earlier proposals in Geneva were mere propaganda. The Europeans would be able to contribute to genuine advances if they displayed sufficient "central intellectual virtue" as described by philosopher Hermann Luebbe (p 3) who says that it consists in the "total readiness to recognize the facts of the matter."

Europeans Must Support Alliance

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 3 Jun 86 p 1

[Editorial by Karl Feldmeyer: "A Warning Against Disengagement"]

[Text] NATO is displaying the signs of political dissension. The NATO Foreign Ministers' Conference in Halifax confirmed that fact in public. Washington gave notice of abandoning the earlier restraints on its strategic arms. SALT II, the never ratified arms limitation treaty, has ceased to exist

for the Americans. The attempt to deal with Moscow on the basis of SALT II is finished. Washington now has only one goal: The reinforcement of its defense and deterrent capability.

This decision does more than create a new situation for Washington's relations with Moscow, it also clears the fronts in the conflict that has raged in the alliance for years. Since the American decision not to ratify the negotiated SALT II Treaty, the allies have nurtured the partly silent partly openly declared reproach that Washington was not doing enough for detente. As a consequence a political attitude grew up in Europe, that aimed to challenge not the Soviet but the chief ally's readiness to make concessions. At the same time the outward appearance of agreement made it easy to assign the words in the joint communiques a different or even contrasting significance.

Washington now has cut away the foundations of this ambivalence. President Reagan's statement and the impressive appearance of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz at the conclusion of the Halifax Conference have shown everybody the light. Washington has dotted the i and crossed the t. Nor is this only a matter of arms control. Soviet policy as a whole is the basis of the U.S. decision to no longer comply with SALT II. This ranges from Moscow's violations of this treaty to its attitude to human rights and its aggression in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The American Administration has pronounced its rejection of the earlier arms control and security policy vis-a-vis Moscow not for itself alone. Instead it reaffirmed its disarmament proposal submitted in Geneva and designed to halve the strategic nuclear systems. Disregarding propagandist reactions to Reagan's change of course, Moscow will have to even more thoroughly consider whether to seriously respond to this offer from Washington or to accept the risk that America, now free of all arms limitations, will do whatever it thinks appropriate from the standpoint of security.

The European allies, too, have been given the impetus to review their own policies. This time they cannot possibly say that they had been taken by surprise and confronted with a fait accompli. They had been consulted and, before the conference, apprised of the decision--albeit it ran counter to their recommendations. The allies will have to come to terms with the fact that Reagan swept aside their objections and thereby indicated his opinion of the alliance's political ranking when the basic issues of his policy are at stake. Many find that a bitter pill to swallow. A foreign minister who, like Genscher, fondly imagined himself to be the one mainly concerned with encouraging Washington's readiness to detente may feel like someone whose efforts have turned in a vacuum.

Emotional reactions are out of place. On the contrary, everybody will have to carefully calculate the responses required in the interest of the Federal Republic and the other West European countries. It would be wrong to conclude that we should disengage ourselves from America and seek to arrive at our own arrangements with the Soviet power. Anyone moving in direction of a withdrawal from the alliance must realize that he thus helps remove the sole reason motivating the Soviet leaders to accept a peaceful order in Europe. Anyone promoting the illusion that an independent national West European

defense policy is possible might find out quicker than expected that the idea of American military withdrawal from Europe is perilously popular on the other side of the Atlantic. Nobody in Washington doubts that a suggestion similar to the one Senator Nunn submitted in the Senate 2 years ago would now be sure of a majority in Congress.

The political crisis in the alliance is too serious to allow fudging the discussion. On the other hand, the fact that a political split is even imaginable also offers us opportunities. For us to use them assumes an unsentimental--in other words rational--alliance policy by all partners. This policy would have to stick to the objective spelled out in the 1967 Harmel Report, that is the achievement of stability by the settlement of political problems, "most of all the German issue." Nothing is likely to threaten such a policy as much as extreme emotionalism about the actual problems of the alliance, fueled by the prospect of gaining easy popularity at home. Neither fear nor resentment will help the return to solidarity. None of us should forget this, despite the forthcoming elections at both sides of the Atlantic.

Consequences Not Yet Clear

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 4 Jun 86 p 12

[Article by Jan Reifenberg: "The Withdrawal from the SALT Treaties"]

[Text] The Geneva negotiations on arms limitation between the United States and the Soviet Union are suffering a double time pressure: Their course is defined on the one hand by President Reagan's announced intention to finally abandon the self-imposed SALT II restrictions--if Moscow fails by the end of this year to show itself willing to concessions on the central question of the reduction of long-range strategic weapons--and on the other by the Soviet proposals for at least 15 years of compliance with the AMB Treaty on the limitation of antimissile systems, including a new interpretation of this so far most important agreement between the superpowers. It is not in doubt that the United States has concluded its abandonment of the arms control policy initiated in 1972. SALT II, a treaty that Reagan described as "fatally flawed," was ratified neither by the U.S. Senate nor has it been able to stem the arms race. Furthermore it was violated by the Soviet Union, by the construction and placement of an inadmissible second movable long-range missile, the SS 25 (72 are now combat ready) and the encoding of the telemetry data of long-range missile tests.

Shultz' Interpretation of the Change

The advocates of arms control nevertheless always considered the tacit compliance with the ceilings fixed in SALT II to be the political and psychological guarantee for the continued attempt--begun by Nixon and Kissinger--to at least pursue in the age of interballistic missiles a "code of behavior" for the two superpowers. Last week, at the NATO Foreign Ministers' Congress in Halifax, America's allies listened to a straightforward interpretation of the change that has occurred in Washington. In future the maintenance of deterrence will take priority over all agreements that are impossible to adhere to because constantly undermined by Moscow. True, we

still do not know whether, at the end of this year, Reagan will actually exceed the admissible ceilings of SALT II by taking into service the 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles. In any case the treaty expired on 31 December 1985. Still, it is obvious and certainly a vital matter for the Geneva negotiators that Washington does not intend to stay fettered by an ineffective treaty, despite all the objections of its NATO partners. Of course Reagan's statement is also meant to exert political pressure on the Soviet Union. Moscow is to be prodded into a speedier decision whether it wishes to embark on a new arms race with America or begin genuine disarmament by reducing its arsenal. Nobody at present in Geneva is able to foretell what Gorbachev will decide. In particular because, in view of U.S. policy, the general secretary must consider whether a flat refusal might lose him the chance at achieving his chief goal--to torpedo the American SDI project--and any opportunity of a second summit this year.

While the NATO foreign ministers met in Halifax, Karpov, the chief Soviet delegate in Geneva, tabled a new proposal that, though not directly linked to Reagan's SALT II decision, affects the entire spectrum of the three areas of negotiation: If both parties were to declare their willingness to comply with the provisions of the ABM Treaty for 15-20 years and interpret them in an expanded fashion, Moscow would be prepared to begin reducing its existing strategic weapons systems. American chief delegate Kampelman and his staff, together with Pentagon experts and the American arms control agency (ACDA) are currently studying this proposal and its possible interpretation. Actually there are two possibilities: It may either be regarded as a new Soviet attempt to kill SDI at its inception, that is research (and thereby safeguard the Soviets' own space defense research results and "killer" satellites), or the Soviet Union has finally realized that it cannot change anything with regard to current American SDI research and is ready to concur with Washington's assertion that this research is compatible with the ABM Treaty.

Exit from the Treaty

The recommendations offered by the American negotiators in Geneva to their superiors in Washington have remained confidential. Nevertheless, Reagan's SALT decision may be the precursor of the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, too. Pentagon technical experts regard the treaty as an obstacle to the implementation of SDI. Weinberger and his staff are convinced that America must modernize its deterrent capability at any price. The Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty by the Soviet radar facility at Krasnoyarsk offers Weinberger

an exit from the treaty. Up to now the President has decided otherwise with regard to SALT II and not least in consideration of the European allies.

It is useful to keep the pertinent figures in mind: America and the Soviet Union are currently equipped to fire at each other about 40,000 warheads each, mounted on strategic weapons. The Soviet Union has mounted around Moscow the only operational and modernized antimissile system. The United States has reduced its system since 1974. To meet the SALT II terms, the Soviets have discarded 1,000 (obsolete) missiles since 1979, America less than 100. Both parties are wrestling for a new interpretation of defense by deterrence. Moscow's military doctrine has never agreed the American offer of a gameplan

involving reciprocal "hostages." SDI means that the Americans, too, are abandoning that concept. It does seem, though, that the realization of Reagan's dream of a Maginot Line in space is many decades off, and that SDI will for the time being amount to only a more modern method of antimissile defense in the final stage of the approach of enemy nuclear weapons carriers. It is not certain whether the U.S. Congress will fully vote the enormous costs of SDI.

By the end of this year, both Reagan and Gorbachev will have to decide whether they are to meet again. Until then it will be clear what Washington intends by its abandonment of SALT II, and what is to become of the ABM Treaty. We will see what Reagan has in mind: By confrontation to force the Soviet Union to concessions or only threaten confrontation in order to achieve a compromise. A compromise might include American willingness to continued compliance with the SALT II ceilings, the Soviet publication of the coded missile test data, advances in direction of 50 percent cuts in long-range missile stocks and a moratorium with regard to the placement of defensive weapons in space. This will affect not only the course of the Geneva negotiations but also the internal cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.

Europeans Need Independent Policies

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 6 Jun 86 p 1

[Article by Christoph Bertram: "It Is Up to Europe Now"]

[Text] The Western Alliance is once again in crisis. However, unlike on the occasion of President Reagan's punitive expedition against Qadhafi a few weeks ago, the dispute does not involve second rate issues of Atlantic defense. This time it concerns the very heart of the Atlantic Alliance.

Ever since the Harmel Report, dating back almost 20 years, the allies have steadily reaffirmed the dual purpose of the alliance: Military security against attack from the East and reduction of the military threat by political cooperation with the East. The June 1985 communique by the NATO foreign ministers once more insisted on this principle: "Deterrence and defense as well as arms control and disarmament are integral elements of the alliance's defense policy."

However, the Reagan Administration has now demonstrated twice in 1 week that it considers these noble words no more than diplomatic cosmetics. At the Human Rights Conference in Berne, intended to produce recommendations for easing human contacts in Europe generally, the adoption of the final document came to grief on Washington's veto alone. A few days later, President Reagan took a step he had hitherto always avoided: Counter to the unanimous vote of the allies, he abrogated the SALT II Treaty on strategic offensive weapons, signed by the two superpowers in 1979 but never ratified. "I have decided that the United States will in future orient their strategic arms measures to the kind and extent of the Soviet threat, not the SALT provisions."

Of course neither text rejected by Washington represents a powerful monument to detente. Both are weak fabrics, vitiated by the acid rain of East-West

tensions. The aborted Berne recommendation would have eased to at least a modest extent some family reunions and visits across the looming frontier and right across Europe. SALT II, for its part, only retains its central importance for strategic arms control because, for the past 7 years, it has been the only means of stemming the arms race between the superpowers. If political disputes had not prevented ratification, the treaty--that anyway expired in 1985--would long have been superseded by a new and better SALT III Treaty.

Nevertheless Reagan's double action signifies a basic change. It is a clear rejection of the Harmel principle that military deterrence and political detente must go hand in hand. The American president deserts the concert with the allies because he wishes to rid himself of the very last chains that might yet obstruct his military programs. At the same time he abjures the perception that an alliance of sovereign nations can keep its cohesion only if the senior power is mindful of the interests of its partners when making its decisions.

Of course Reagan tried to hide this intent behind a veil of self-justification. The Soviets had not complied with important provisions of the SALT II Treaty. Although some of these complaints are true, it is obvious that the real or alleged Soviet treaty violations offer merely the pretext for the American abandonment of SALT. After all, it was Reagan not the Soviets who prevented the treaty from ever being ratified and therefore mandatory in law; it was deemed "basically flawed." Moreover, even if the Soviet treaty violations were serious from the military aspect, less radical sanctions than complete abandonment would have been possible. Finally: The President and his Defense Secretary Weinberger have constantly emphasized that they would respect even the duly ratified and unlimited ABM Treaty (restricting antimissile systems) only as long as it did not collide with SDI, their pet project. Anyone dealing with treaties so offhandedly cannot complain when the other party leaves much to be desired with regard to treaty loyalty.

The latest U.S. response to the Soviets' new and important change in attitude at Geneva shows that the President is not concerned with arms control but with arms as such. . Since the restart of the negotiations on strategic arms limitations in spring 1985, Moscow had refused to even negotiate the reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles as long as Washington insisted on excluding ceilings on defensive systems in space. The Soviet are now inclined to let go of this connection as long as some aspects of the ABM Treaty are strengthened and reaffirmed. This probably also means that the Soviet Union is now ready to drop its long resistance to SDI research as long as no development and testing of space systems occurs. However, Weinberger promptly declared that he would reject any agreement obstructing research, development and, ultimately, the placement of SDI systems.

From whatever angle we look at it, Reagan has dismissed arms control for the time being. In any case he never liked the idea. The President considers his freedom of action more important than any obligation on the rival to comply with treaties. In any event, Washington believes that Gorbachev is in trouble, and there is therefore no reason whatever for the Americans to make

concessions to the Soviets. And the next summit? "If no summit takes place this year," an intimate Reagan adviser said, "we don't mind either."

Reagan has never made a secret of his inability to do anything with the concept of detente. At the same time his Administration used to at least formally comply with the two parts of the Harmel resolution. This apparently will not be the case in future. The senior power is no longer willing to agree that leadership also implies the necessity for it as well as the allies to observe the principles elaborated. Washington now does not consider Harmel a binding guideline for the alliance.

In Willy Brandt's words, "the alliance is emptied." How is the damage to be repaired? The crisis is no longer manageable by the customary calls for harmony that governments tend to have ready for such eventualities, nor will it be settled by the equally customary grumbling about the unreasonable American Ally. Rather, Europe might help if America is stuck. The European partners of the United States will at last have to define the political tasks of the alliance. If they wish to prevent the further decay of the alliance and the militarization of East-West relations, they will have to take three steps right now:

First: The Europeans must do everything possible for the American president to withdraw his abandonment of SALT. Reagan did leave a backdoor open: He might review his decision if the Soviet Union were to improve its behavior. The end of SALT will not be inevitable until the fall. Until then, the West European governments will have to urge the president to use this back door--and they can rely on the support of all those in Washington who share their concerns. At the Halifax NATO Conference, America's allies unanimously displayed their displeasure, they will now have to give it greater emphasis.

Second: Unless arms control is definitely to fall victim to the vision of Star Wars, the allies will have to take up the latest Soviet proposal and urge that the provisions of the ABM Treaty be strengthened. After all, the European governments have requested just this in all the to and fro about SDI. If they wish to be taken seriously by Moscow and Washington, they will have to prove that they mean what they say.

Third: As long as Washington stonewalls, at least the European governments must indicate to Moscow that Gorbachev's various proposals are not treated as mere propaganda but subjected to serious study. A new opportunity to do this will soon arise. The Soviet general secretary wants to next week precisely define his conceptions on conventional arms control "from the Atlantic to the Urals." The foreign ministers assembled in Halifax have appointed a study group which, admittedly, is not due to report until the fall. Earlier would be better.

Of course, an independent West European policy is not going to emerge without birth pangs. The Americans are bound to suspect that Moscow is coming closer to its goal of splitting the Western Alliance. Nevertheless, the West

Europeans should not be scared off their efforts to define alliance policy in their terms. The cohesion of the alliance is now threatened less by Soviet siren songs than by America's insistence on its own approach. It is up to Europe to prevent the latest Atlantic crisis from culminating in permanent alienation. The Federal Government likes to boast of its influence in Washington and other capitals. It should now give a demonstration of this influence.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: MITTERRAND VISIT, NUCLEAR TESTS, GENEVA TALKS

LD112056 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Jul 86

["International Situation -- Questions and Answers" program presented by All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, with political observer G.A. Shishkin; Sergey Pravdin -- not further identified; commentator Vladimir Pashko; New York correspondent Vladimir Svyagin; All-Union Radio commentator Viktor Levin; and commentator Boris Andrianov]

[Excerpt] [Lavrentyev] Many letters which have come in to the editorial office in recent days touch upon, in one way or other, the theme that concerns all of us. This is the way in which relations are developing between East and West in the main areas -- questions of curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, the search for accords on preventing it from moving into space and on eliminating chemical weapons.

To a certain extent the way to achieve these noble aims was pointed out during the official visit to our country by Francois Mitterrand, President of France, and his meetings and conversations with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I shall ask political observer Gennadiy Arkadiyevich Shishkin to sum up the results of this visit. Gennadiy Arkadiyevich, please.

[Shishkin] Throughout the world there is widespread comment on the results of the Soviet-French talks in Moscow. In the many foreign responses particular attention is being paid to the meetings and talks, one to one, between Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and French President Mitterrand. It is stressed that they were held in the spirit of sincerity and striving for mutual understanding which is characteristic of them and in an atmosphere of that high responsibility for European and international security, for the state of Soviet-French relations which lies upon the leaders of the two countries.

The USSR and France belong to two opposing social systems but, nonetheless, thanks to the state will, persistence in the development of political, economic, cultural and other links which was displayed by both sides, they were able to achieve great successes in the development of bilateral relations on a mutually advantageous and friendly basis. Thus, what has been happening over the past few days in Moscow goes far beyond the framework of Soviet-French relations. As many observers stress, they can rightly be considered as the harbinger of positive progress on an all-European scale. Thus, the USSR and France are giving a good -- and in our time such a necessary -- example to Europe and to the whole world.

As is shown by newspaper commentaries, by politicians and public figures speaking in European capitals, a great impression has been made on our continent by the thought expressed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that the aim of contemporary diplomacy should be detente. It is clear that although everyone throughout the world would benefit from detente, this concerns Europe in the first instance.

Everyone now can see that the Europeans have had a surfeit of anxiety, confrontation and tension. They need the fresh air of detente. Here in Europe they are more acutely aware of the seriousness of the international situation and the increase in the threat of war. For it is precisely here that powerful military groupings confront each other, that mountains of weapons have been piled up and that new nuclear missiles are being deployed.

All this was discussed seriously and in detail during the Soviet-French talks. In his speech at the Kremlin dinner, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev particularly stressed that Europe is called on to be an example of cohabitation of sovereign, different but peace-loving states which recognize their mutual dependence and construct their relations on trust. The main road toward achieving this lies via freeing Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, from the explosive burden of armaments.

In this connection, I recall that during a visit to Stockholm a few days ago I had the opportunity to have a conversation with Frank Blackaby, Director of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research. Just imagine if some being from another planet should suddenly come to Europe. I think that he would be completely unable to understand why this old continent is divided into two camps, armed to the teeth, even though there is not a single real problem which could give rise to a war which threatens total annihilation.

I believe that not only a being from another planet but all of us do not understand why and for what reason it is necessary to pile up ever more mountains of weapons. My conversation in the Stockholm institute served only to confirm once again that in Europe and, indeed throughout the world, demands are growing for 1986, which the United Nations has declared International Peace Year, to be marked by specific steps in the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, in the strengthening of universal security and the improvement of international cooperation.

Under these conditions, even the Washington administration clearly cannot allow itself not to notice the numerous peace initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union since the beginning of this year. For example, U.S. President Reagan admitted in one of his latest addresses -- though he did so with reservations -- the seriousness of the new proposals for reducing nuclear armaments which have been put forward by the Soviet Union. He stated that there might now be a turning point in efforts toward strengthening security and peace throughout the world and in this connection he raised once again the issue of a Soviet-U.S. summit.

As has been stated on more than one occasion, the Soviet Union cannot but welcome it if Washington takes up a more serious and more responsible attitude toward disarmament problems. But high-sounding statements about a desire for peace and disarmament are not enough. Concrete actions are needed, concrete and constructive proposals in response. And with respect to all of this, things are clearly not good in the U.S. capital.

To start with, take the fact that, according to official White House statements, Reagan intends to reply only in a few weeks' time to the latest letter from Mikhail

Sergeyevich Gorbachev containing specific proposals on how to break the impasse on the question of maintaining armaments. In the meantime, Regan, the leader of the White House staff apparatus, reassures the press that the administration is studying the Soviet proposals carefully.

But this isn't the whole story. Everything indicates that Washington is busy not so much examining what the U.S. contribution itself should be to the solution of the problem of limiting and reducing armaments, but studying the question of how to avoid altogether the conclusion of any agreement in this field with minimum damage to the administration.

Influential figures in the administration like Weinberger, his assistant Perle, and many others openly oppose any agreement and are in favor of an uncontrolled race in nuclear and space armaments with the object of achieving superiority over the Soviet Union. Hence, all the concrete and constructive Soviet proposals remain unanswered. Hence, too, nuclear explosions resound on the Nevada proving ground in response to the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear tests, which has already been extended on three occasions and which has been in force for nearly a whole year.

It has again been announced in Washington that the United States intends to carry out another nuclear explosion at the Nevada proving ground, the 13th since the Soviet moratorium was introduced, on 26 July.

Insisting again and again on the implementation of the program it has put forward for the elimination of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible, the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that the present balance of nuclear armaments is capable only of ensuring equality of danger to both sides. Given a continuation of the arms race, this danger is capable of reaching a point where parity will cease to be a factor of restraint.

Even THE NEW YORK TIMES, noting that the very idea of establishing control over armaments is now at a crossroads in the United States, stresses that the opportunity for implementing it will exist only for a short time. Perhaps there is less than a year available for that course. Thereafter, types of decisions might be made that will be difficult and perhaps even impossible to cancel by political means. In addition, the development of technology will change the system whereby the balance between the two countries is calculated and the chances of halting -- not to mention of turning back -- the uncontrolled arms race are receding into distant future. The threat to peace will become even more serious.

The Soviet proposals aimed at avoiding precisely this danger about which the NEW YORK TIMES warns still lie unanswered in the White House and on the Geneva talks table.

There is the program for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the century, set out in the statement made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January. There is the idea of setting up an all-embracing system of international security which was announced at the 27th CPSU Congress in February. There are the specific proposals making it easier to reach agreement on removing medium-range missiles in Europe. There is the interim version of the approach to reducing nuclear armaments which was proposed by the Soviet Union in Geneva, that an accord should be reached on not withdrawing from the ABM treaty for at least 15 years and that work within the field of the strategic defense initiative should be limited to the level of laboratory research, that is, to the threshold the United States has in fact already approached. And finally, there are the proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest concerning a reciprocal and considerable reduction in land forces and in

strike tactical air forces in Europe, as a result of the implementation of which armed forces would be reduced by one-fourth by the beginning of the 1990's, that is, by a total of 1 million men.

The numerous reactions that continue to come in concerning the Soviet-French talks from all corners of the earth are evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union's peace initiatives are exerting a great influence upon world public opinion. Under their influence, realization is strengthening in the West of the fact that ensuring security through disarmament in today's interlinked world requires joint efforts and contributions by one and all, bringing into operation of the whole disarmament mechanism.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA WEEKLY REVIEW: SDI, MITTERAND VISIT, EUROPEAN ISSUES

PM151503 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jul 86 First Edition p 4

[Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "International Review"]

[Excerpts] What Is Needed Is Good Will

Currently people's eyes are focused on Moscow where a noteworthy new tradition -- the Goodwill Games -- has been initiated. The flags of more than 70 countries are fluttering above the sports facilities of the Soviet capital. This great international festival is taking place under the motto "From Friendship in Sport Toward Peace on Earth." For this reason it is an important event not just in the area of sports but also in the endeavor to improve the international atmosphere.

The ceremonial opening of the games, which was attended by Soviet leaders, had a particularly great political impact in the United States and in many other countries. The U.S. public was once again able to see for itself how much the USSR has done to ensure that 1986 is truly a year of peace. The program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons was closely followed by the idea of creating a comprehensive system of international security and the constructive proposals for delivering Europe from medium-range missiles and banning and destroying chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions three times with the result that it now spans a full year. And finally, the socialist community countries put forward a detailed plan for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

All these peace-loving initiatives are aimed at creating a starting point from which it would be possible to redirect the increasingly dangerous race toward the abyss in the opposite direction, the direction of disarmament. However, because of the stance adopted by Washington, there is no progress. Worse still, the U.S. Administration is trying to remove the last curbs which contained the arms race -- the SALT II Treaty and other Soviet-American agreements. A recent interview by the West German newspaper DIE WELT of Defense Secretary Weinberger reflects Washington's attitude to these documents.

The Russians have proposed to reduce strategic delivery vehicles by one-third in exchange for a pledge that you will not withdraw from the ABMTreaty for at least 15 years. What is your view of this?" -- the Pentagon chief was asked.

"Such a pledge would deprive us of the right to break away from the treaty which we now have, provided we give 6 months notice. I am categorically against giving up anything that meets our national interests and the right to break away from the treaty meets our interests," Weinberger replied.

Speaking in Glassboro recently, President Reagan, albeit with reservations, acknowledged the importance of the new Soviet proposals for nuclear arms reductions. He declared that a turning point may now be reached in the efforts aimed at strengthening security and peace throughout the world and in this context he once again raised the question of the Soviet-American summit.

If Washington is truly ready to adopt a more serious and responsible attitude to disarmament problems, then this can only be welcomed. But as the U.S. President rightly noted, talking alone is not enough now. The Soviet Union has never tired of repeating this and has backed up its desire for disarmament with constructive steps. The peoples hope that the U.S. Administration will join in the Soviet initiatives and make possible the summit and the elaboration of agreements.

The Soviet Union favors dialogue. But it must be a dialogue in which both sides seek to achieve concrete results. Talks must not be allowed to be used as a smokescreen to cover up the arms race. The USSR will have no part in misleading the world public in this way.

A Generator of Healthy Tendencies

During the past week President Francois Mitterand of France was the official guest of the Soviet Union. The current Soviet-French talks at summit level were held 20 years after the historic visit to the USSR of Charles de Gaulle--the visit which not only initiated a new stage in bilateral interstate relations but signaled the positive changes that were to come in Europe as a whole.

Our states stood at the cradle of detente. They made the first steps toward overcoming the consequences of the "cold war" and establishing the new norms in the mutual relations between states with different social systems. The experience of the past two decades clearly shows that when both sides display political will and persistence in the development of political, economic, cultural, and other ties, everyone stands to gain. This is a positive example, much needed by Europe and the world.

During the French president's visit, the Soviet side reaffirmed its intention to expand the areas of agreement and cooperation between Moscow and Paris and to spare no effort to ensure that the Soviet-French dialogue once again becomes a generator of healthy tendencies in international politics.

The goal of current diplomatic efforts must be detente. This applies to Europe above all. During the past week the European public learned with alarm that of 20 U.S. air bases abroad at which nuclear-equipped U.S. aircraft are kept in a state of constant combat readiness, 14 are located in West Europe--5 in the FRG, 3 each in Britain and Italy, and 1 each in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece.

However, it is not just nuclear war which presents a lethal danger to the Old World. There are more than 150 nuclear reactors on European territory and hundreds of chemical plants. Thus even conventional weapons could serve as a means of mass destruction, not to mention that an armed conflict in the center of Europe would act as a detonator triggering a world catastrophe.

Europeans in particular need the atmosphere of detente, they are more acutely aware of the seriousness of the international situation and the increasing threat of war. After all it is Europe where powerful military groupings confront each other, mountains of weapons have been stockpiled, and nuclear missiles are deployed. On the other hand, it is also in Europe that valuable experience in peaceful coexistence has been accumulated.

Europe's economic and political potential is sufficiently great to speak up for itself more resolutely and confidently. We can only agree with what the French President said in the Kremlin: "Europe must once again in effect play the main part in its own history so as to fully discharge its mission as a factor of equilibrium and stability in international relations."

The talks' participants paid special attention to Europe's part in world developments. They agreed that the Soviet Union and France, acting jointly or side by side, can do a great deal for the interests of the continent as a whole. Europe is called upon to set an example of the coexistence of sovereign, peace-loving states which are aware of their interdependence and base their relations on trust.

The highway toward this goal lies through delivering Europe from its explosive military burden. The recent proposal of the USSR and its allies to reduce armed forces and conventional arms in Europe makes it possible to objectively eliminate misgivings -- insincere and genuine ones -- based on the claim that the elimination of the nuclear potential on the continent would impair the equilibrium in favor of the socialist countries, which allegedly possess superiority in conventional arms.

The sides noted that collaboration between the Soviet Union and France is conducive to channeling international relations in a health direction. The fruitful conclusion of the Stockholm conference and the galvanization of the entire all-European process on the eve and in connection with the upcoming Vienna meeting of the 35 states' representatives would be of major significance in this respect. The all-European process can and must develop in all spheres -- political, economic, and humanitarian and cultural -- so that all three Helsinki "baskets" are filled with fresh and useful fruits.

Commenting on the official statement issued at the end of the Soviet-French talks, the AP agency draws attention to the unanimous view expressed by the sides that accords which curb the arms race and prevent it from spreading to other spheres must not be broken. It is worth noting, the agency writes, that the French president again expressed opposition to the militarization of space.

The results of the visit have confirmed that the rich and productive political dialogue between the USSR and France has great, indispensable potential for positive influence on the whole of European and world affairs.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: MITTERAND VISIT, MEDITERRANEAN, SDI, SALT

LD131730 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 13 Jul 86

["International Observers Round Table" program presented by Nikolay Agayants with Spartak Beglov, political observer of the NOVOSTI news agency and Yuriy Kornilov, TASS political observer]

[Text] [Agayants] Hello, comrades! The past week has been marked by an event of great significance and importance, the Soviet-French summit talks that have ended in Moscow. The results of these talks are today at the center of attention of overseas mass media and eminent politicians and public figures in many countries. It is generally admitted that the Soviet Union's principled position in international affairs was displayed particularly strongly at these talks: the position that everything possible should be done to strengthen peace on our planet, to curb the dizzy arms race on earth and prevent its being extended into outer space and to develop mutual understanding and cooperation. Running through all reaction from overseas has been the thought that the dialogue between Moscow and Paris, which has been both packed with content and productive, does have a considerable potential for exerting a positive influence on events and processes that are taking place on the European Continent today and in present-day international relations. I will quote just a few of the most characteristic points that have been made in this connection.

In the view of the French newspaper LIBERATION, the current Soviet-French summit meeting will certainly give a push in the right direction to the solution of a number of important and acute problems, including those concerning arms reduction issues. These talks, states the Bulgarian RABOTNICHESKO DELO, the organ of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee, serve the stabilization of detente which is useful to all. Both sides have placed the accent on the need to continue efforts aimed at making the detente process an irreversible one and also at asserting detente in the military sphere. As the West German GENERALANZEIGER points out, the Soviet and French leaders, having expressed concern over the present condition of East-West relations, were united in the view that a new, realistic approach is now needed to solve the problems that exist in the world. Another thing that was said: The Algerian AL-SHA'B wrote during the past few days, and I quote, the Soviet-French talks are important not just because of the wide range of disarmament and bilateral relations topics touched upon during them, but also because of the realistic assessment of the present-day international situation. The Soviet Union calls upon the Western partners to display responsibility and flexibility, to make serious reciprocal concessions on foundations of equality and identical security, and to take part in international cooperation on the most important problems of the present day.

[Beglov] These were indeed very important talks that amount to a landmark in world politics. If one is to speak about outward appearances they were distinguished by a very friendly character and a friendly atmosphere. They were very thorough as far as the character of the discussions was concerned. One member of the French delegation has quoted calculations indicating that the French President and the CPSU Central Committee general secretary spent a total of 16 and 1/2 hours together, if one includes, of course, not just the conversations on the agenda of the talks but various important protocol measures. As you have already said, at the center of attention were issues of cooperation and security in Europe, the disarmament problem, and expanding the existing good and friendly relations between the two countries. These talks and conversations rested on a tradition of Soviet-French dialogue that is already strong. Everyone these days has been recalling the fact that the historic visit to the USSR of General Charles De Gaulle, president of France, took place exactly 20 years ago, a visit that gave the green light to the first wave of detente.

This was the 14th Soviet-French summit meeting in the postwar period. And from the viewpoint of the dynamics of Soviet-French relations there are full grounds for stating -- and this was stressed by President Mitterrand at the press conference -- that the Soviet-French dialogue, as it is shown by this meeting, is developing along an ascendent line.

What, then, are the new qualities that this meeting has brought to the general approach of the USSR and France to the international problems that have become ripe? First of all there is the fact that the issue of an innovative and positive role for Europe has been raised in a more precise and deep way. It was stressed at the meeting that Europe has a sufficiently great economic and political potential to speak more definitely and more confidently on its own behalf. I quote those words from the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The French president was wholly in agreement with him on the issue. He said that Europe must indeed once again become a principal actor in its own history, so that it can fully play its role as a factor of equilibrium and stability in international relations.

Well, how can all this be translated into the language of concrete deeds? First and foremost, of course, it is a question of intensifying bilateral cooperation in bringing about a successful result at the Stockholm conference, where issues and measures for strengthening confidence, security, and disarmament in Europe are under discussion. Large-scale proposals have been put forward there, as our listeners know, and these proposals have been put forward mainly, if one is to talk about the most constructive points in the work of the Stockholm conference, by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. But the fact that Eastern Europe is the author of these proposals certainly does not mean that they express just one-sided interests. Here it is now very important to cross the threshold of prejudice or NATO's automatic negativism, if you like, according to which everything must be assessed this way: what's good for the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact is bad for NATO and Western Europe. The character of the dialogue in Moscow, the atmosphere of the discussions in Moscow, the fact that both sides, both the Soviet leadership and the French leadership, agreed to further strengthen their cooperation within the framework of the Stockholm conference, this of course will serve as a good stimulus for success at the Stockholm forum. If one is going to speak about wider proposals that also affect our continent, then of course there was very serious discussion of the latest proposals put forward in Budapest by the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries concerning deep and substantial reductions in conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. As a spokesman for the French delegation said, these proposals made a very great impression, as did the further elucidation of these proposals that was given by the Soviet leadership. In this respect -- as the

French stressed -- they have now become even more convinced that if these proposals are implemented, they will indeed become an answer to French concerns about the need for maintaining a constant equilibrium in conventional armaments in order to also make nuclear disarmament possible. Well, in this sense the concern of France has, as they say, been taken into consideration and it is expected that a more active approach will now be seen on the part of France to issues concerning disarmament in Europe.

[Agayants] Spartak Ivanovich, I would also add that it is generally believed that co-operation between the USSR and France naturally makes it easier to put international relations onto the healthy footing that is demanded by the new thinking; an understanding of the interdependence of states at this point in time and consideration for the interests of all. As was stressed during the Soviet-French talks in Moscow, the Soviet leadership proceeds from the fact that this is now the common task and it values highly the possibilities and the contribution of France along this path.

[Kornilov] Nikolay Ivanovich, there is one thing I would like to add. As usual at our Sunday round table, we are today analyzing the week's events -- things that have happened over the past 7 days -- and in fact there was another event or more precisely another date this week: On Saturday 12 July it was the 450th anniversary of the death of Erasmus of Rotterdam. He was a great humanist and Renaissance writer who, as is well known, lashed fanaticism and violence in his world famous "In Praise of Folly" mocking those who try to achieve ignoble aims by waving the sword and by using deceit of every kind. Of course, centuries have passed since those days, the world has changed beyond recognition, and it is clear from our discussion today that this has not always been for the better. As we see, adherence to violence is not simply a vice which characterizes a particular influential figure today, it is the pivot of the policy of whole imperialist states. And as far as hypocrisy and deceit are concerned, what other words can be used to describe the actions of those circles in the West which call for peace in what they say but continue to wind up the arms race in what they do, pushing the planet in precisely the opposite direction. And I will add that waving swords in our day is not simply folly as it was in Erasmus' day, for today the sword is a nuclear missile and those who brandish them threaten no more and no less than the very fate of human civilization.

[Agayants] The letter published this week from Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar dealing with the problem of ensuring security in the Mediterranean falls within the category of the consistent, peace-loving Leninist foreign policy of our state, within the same category as the latest important specific and constructive peace initiatives put forward by the USSR. In the present complicated and tense international situation, the letter says, it is essential for practical actions to be undertaken urgently to ensure a change for the better by the joint efforts of states and to begin moving toward the creation of a reliable and all-embracing system of international security which will embrace all regions of the world and the Mediterranean Sea in particular. Our country, as is known, has put forward a far-reaching initiative, that the U.S. and USSR navies should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean Sea. We are prepared to start talks without delay on this issue. However, so far there has been no reply from Washington. Urgent steps capable of reducing white-hot tension and normalizing the situation in the Mediterranean Sea area are now needed as never before, though of course laborious work by all sides that are interested in this is needed to achieve this. In the view of our state the United Nations must use all its authority and opportunities to encourage in practical terms the transformation of the Mediterranean into an area of firm peace, security, and cooperation.

[Beglov] Returning to the results of the Soviet-French talks in their widest aspects one ought also to mention another point which is of great importance for the rest of the world. The USSR and French leaders agreed completely that it is essential for equilibrium to be observed to achieve success in the disarmament dialogue, accords which restrain the arms race and its extension into outer space must not be violated. This is the opinion both of the USSR and France. It is clear that this refers to the observance of the provisions of the SALT II treaty and the treaty without time limit which limits antiballistic missile defense systems — the ABM Treaty. This is of direct relevance to the Soviet-American talks which are taking place in Geneva and also to the fate of a new Soviet-American summit meeting. It is no secret that the U.S. side is making more than a few attempts — mainly propaganda attempts — to depict the situation as one in which it is not now up to the Americans, that they are willing for such a meeting to go ahead and do not see any particular obstacles to this. And this at a time when Moscow is making it clearly understood that steps like the White House refusal to carry out the provisions of the SALT II treaty certainly do not favor an improvement in the atmosphere for a summit meeting. Now has the U.S. side replied to the latest Soviet proposals put forward at the Geneva talks.

In Washington, too, they must see clearly that the U.S. refusal to confine itself solely to research in the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative will make it impossible to have any productive talks about specific measures to limit strategic offensive weapons. Moreover, U.S. leaders who hold the keys to the military programs and military strategy in their hands are stubbornly insisting on the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative as the most promising way of securing U.S. interests in the military sphere. And it is quite logical for THE WASHINGTON POST to observe, as it did on Thursday, that in connection with hints that the White House is preparing a U.S. reply to the USSR, Weinberger is opposing any limitations on the future deployment [razvertyvaniye] of antimissile defenses. At the same time virtually all political observers who have commented upon the visits by Mitterrand, the president of France, to the United States, and to the USSR are united in their conclusion that — and here I am quoting LIBERATION — that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is the main obstacle at the Soviet-American disarmament talks.

This ought to be clear to everyone. The question is, what kind of appropriate atmosphere for the Soviet-American talks is there to speak of, if Reagan's comrades-in-arms insist on retaining this main obstacle? Surely they are not so naive as to suppose that the Soviet side will refrain from the legal basis constituted by the ABM Treaty? But if this is the case, then it is impossible not to conclude that their final aim — and I mean the aim of the U.S. hawks — is to disrupt the Soviet-American summit. It is no coincidence that many observers are now writing about the so-called disarray and disagreements in the Washington bureaucracy which is preparing a reply to the Soviet proposals. Behind these so-called disagreements there is nothing other than uncerecermonious pressure by the hawks.

[Agayants] At this point, Spartak Ivanovich, I would like to return to that important subject which you touched upon. Judging by the most recent reports, the actions of many high-ranking officials in the present Washington administration run directly counter to those accords which were reached in November last year in Geneva at the Soviet-American summit. I wish to recall that at that time, the decision was taken to hold a new Soviet-American summit. Evaluating the situation in his speech at the routine session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that people will be waiting for practical movement forward along the path outlined at

Geneva. This is precisely what we shall be striving for. It is necessary to start making preparations right now for a routine Soviet-American summit and above all in the sphere of practical politics. And the USSR has covered half the path which was envisaged in the Geneva accord. In order not to jeopardize future accords from being reached, we are convinced in the USSR that both sides must refrain from actions which undermine what was achieved in Geneva. But what are they doing in Washington? Are they refraining from actions which would obstruct talks and which would erode the existing limitations to the arms race? That presumes, in particular, an honest and precise observation of the ABM Treaty, and the continued observation by both the United States and the USSR of the relevant tenets of the SALT II treaty.

Thus, we have become witnesses to the fact that the present Washington administration, despite the accords which were reached last November in Geneva, is now setting out with the aim, well, if not to disrupt the new summit, then to significantly complicate its being held.

[Beglov] Or to start a game in which, as they say, only the hawks will be able to reap the profits, certainly not the supporters of disarmament and stable peace and international security.

[Agayants] In this connection, people in the United States write a lot about the possibility of a second Soviet-American summit.

Only last Thursday, I will remind you that Kalb, a State Department representative, speaking to journalists, said in effect that it is necessary to get the process of organizing the meeting moving. What can one say on this issue, Yuriy Emmanuilovich?

[Kornilov] Our country is in favor of normal, good relations with the United States, it goes without saying, on the basis of equal rights and mutual benefit. In our view it is very important that in the current difficult situation between our states, dialogue at all levels is maintained and developed. But the state of and the prospects for Soviet-American relations have to be defined above all by progress in the main area, in moving along the path of limiting the arms race, along the path of reviving detente and of establishing trust between the states on this basis. It is from this viewpoint that the Soviet leadership also sees the question of a new Soviet-American summit.

[Agayants] In the American and indeed in all the Western press, they are continuing to whip up the points made in the recent speech by U.S. President Reagan in Glassboro, New Jersey, in which he conceded, albeit not without reservations, the seriousness of the Soviet proposals on reducing nuclear weapons and spoke in favor of doing away with suspicions and of replacing them with mutual understanding and a striving for a real reduction in arms. Here in front of me is one of the most recent issues of THE NEW YORK TIMES which evaluates this speech as a manifestation of a passionate desire to start talks and to hold a second summit.

[Kornilov] Well, in the President's Glassboro speech there are, of course, healthy elements. But after all, it has been known for a long time that the only genuine criterion as to the true content of the policy of this or that state is not declarations and statements, although the tone and the direction of these declarations often play no small part, but the main criterion is deeds. And Washington's deeds, so far at least, not only fail to strengthen the President's peace-making declarations, but on the contrary strikingly contradict them. In this context, I recall this odd fact. Even in 1972, the leaders of the U.S. Defense Department, preparing to start a new round of

propagandist hullabaloo about the mythical Soviet threat, ordered military intelligence to prepare a report expressed in the appropriate spirit as to how crafty Moscow was allegedly aiming to make use of achievements in parapsychology to take over the West. The authors of the report -- it was declassified in 1978 by the way -- announced that the achievements which exist in the given field in the USSR may, sooner or later, as it was put then, allow the Russians not only to know the content of top secret documents prepared in Washington, but learn from afar the thoughts of the main military and civilian leaders. There you have the kind of thing which can be cooked up about Soviet aggressiveness which frightens not only citizens, but themselves, too. But the investigations of the military intelligence experts beg the question of why it is actually necessary to mobilize some supposed secret parapsychologists to discover from afar the thoughts of Washington strategists? Because after all these thoughts and plans are more than evident from the very essence of U.S. foreign policy.

It is not clear in which direction certain U.S. circles would like things to go, since they are so stubbornly attempting to pave the way through space to military superiority and since they are destroying the Soviet-American SALT II treaty? Is it not these circles which are replying to our country's appeal to stop testing nuclear weapons by more and more explosions of such weapons in the Nevada testing area, and to the peace initiative on eliminating barbaric chemical warfare means by creating a particularly sophisticated type of chemical weapon -- binary weapons? And when, for example, touching upon the possibility of and prospects for a Soviet-American summit meeting, THE WASHINGTON POST complains in a recent article that the glow of the fire in the Geneva fireplace, as it put it, is now almost invisible, it is pertinent to ask just who is extinguishing the fire of hope kindled in Geneva.

To follow THE WASHINGTON POST's example and use various metaphors and comparisons, one has good grounds for saying that real and specific steps by the USSR and the United States aimed at curbing the arms race would be the best fuel for preserving the flames in the Geneva fireplace. The USSR is doing everything to achieve progress in this key area by coming out in favor of the elimination of lethal nuclear weapons by the end of the century, of an end to testing of such weapons, of preventing the militarization of space, and of eliminating nuclear weapons and considerably reducing conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, about which, incidentally, we have already spoken today.

And all these proposals have been met in Washington, I repeat, at least up until now, by a resounding and unequivocal no. Against this backdrop, what can one say about the lofty phrases used by various Western, especially U.S. mass information organs, about the United States advocating dialogue? Moreover, these lofty phrases are accompanied by the rhetorical question: But what is the USSR's position? It is quite obvious that the very formulation of the question as to whether our country supports Soviet-American dialogue results either from a lack of knowledge or, more likely, from a striving to deliberately distort the essence of our position. Once again I repeat that our country is for dialogue and for a new Soviet-American summit meeting, but for it to be held at least two things are required: an appropriate political atmosphere and a willingness to see the meeting bring a palpable practical result if only on one or two issues of concern to the world. Otherwise, there would be no point to such a meeting. It is essential that the Geneva atmosphere be preserved, or revived as it would now be more precise to say, and here it is up to Washington to act and only up to Washington.

[Agayants] You know, there is nothing secret that will not come out sooner or later. The truth of this old saying has been confirmed once more in Washington where new and

long-concealed data on what is called the U.S. bases policy has become public knowledge. This data testifies that at 20 U.S. Air Force facilities in Western Europe and the Far East, including the FRG, Great Britain, Italy and S. Korea, U.S. aircraft with nuclear weapons on board are kept at constant round-the-clock combat readiness -- a fact that cannot fail to arouse and is arousing the most serious concern and alarm among the progressive world public and all people of goodwill, no matter where they may live or what their views.

[Kornilov] I would add the following, Nikolay Ivanovich, to what you have said about the U.S. bases. At one point the periodical U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT testifies that for 27 years -- they took the period from 1945 to 1972 -- U.S. troops virtually every year, as the periodical wrote, interfered in the affairs of various countries in almost every corner of the world. Today, this power pressure in every direction, based on the doctrine of neoglobalism devised in Washington, is being put into effect on an even larger -- one could say unprecedented -- scale. One only has to recall such instances as the undeclared wars unleashed by Washington against Afghanistan and Nicaragua, U.S. brigandage in Lebanon, the occupation of Grenada, and the piratical attack on Libya. In striving to confirm its commanding role in all vitally important regions of the world, Washington relies on what is called the forward basing system. Over 1,500 military bases and facilities strewn across the territory of more than 30 states -- such is the network created by the Pentagon, a network of hotbeds of militarism and of strong points of aggression. This policy is resolutely rejected by all who strive for an improvement in the international climate and I remind you of what was said on this subject in the communique of the socialist states' conference in Budapest. I quote: The Warsaw Pact participant states confirm their stance in favor of continuing efforts on an international scale to eliminate foreign military bases and withdraw troops from foreign territory.

The new data, secret data, about U.S. military bases which has filtered through to the press and about which you, Nikolay Ivanovich, were speaking, once again confirm the importance and topicality of the stance on eliminating bases, which was put forward in Budapest.

[Agayants] To sum up our meeting today, I would like to conclude by saying the following. The introduction of a new approach to resolving issues relating to international security, as was noted both at the 27th CPSU Congress and in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's latest speeches, is naturally a lengthy and complicated process -- and sometimes an extremely painful one too. It demands the complete mobilization of all peace-loving forces and realistically-minded politicians, a review of many dogmas and stereotypes which have formed over decades, and a radical clearing away of the obstructions and blockages on the path to achieving the aim of a world without weapons and without wars. For the USSR the struggle against the danger of a new war and for stable peace and security is not some kind of propaganda maneuver or trick designed for short-term advantage, as is repeated day and night by the bourgeois propagandists; it is a principled and consistent course enshrined in our state's constitution, its basic statute, where it is plainly stated that the USSR steadfastly pursues the Leninist policy of peace, advocates the consolidation of the peoples' security and broad international cooperation.

Our time has come to an end and on that we finish our broadcast. Thank you, comrades, for your attention. All the best to you.

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RELATED ISSUES

AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION MEETS WITH GROMYKO

LD280440 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2300 GMT 27 Jun 86

[Text] Moscow -- In the past, too, the Soviet Union made proposals to ban nuclear arms, but now it is sounding the tocsin -- this was how the Soviet Union's struggle for nuclear disarmament at the present stage was characterised by Andrey Gromyko, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, when speaking with a delegation of the Australian Parliament. He received the guests from Australia in the Kremlin today. The delegation is headed by the speaker of the House of Representatives of that country's Parliament, Joan Child.

Elimination of the threat of nuclear war is the paramount issue today, Andrey Gromyko stressed. What turn the further development of the international situation takes, whether mankind comes still closer to a new world nuclear conflagration or whether it prevents it -- nobody can be indifferent about this.

In this connection the attention of the Australian MPs was drawn to the historic Soviet foreign policy initiatives and first of all the January 15, 1986 statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev outlining a concrete programme of fully eliminating nuclear arms on earth by the end of the present century. The policy of nuclear disarmament and strengthening peace, approved by the party's 27th congress, has become the cause of the Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people. This policy should become the vital cause of all people on earth.

The importance of averting an arms race in outer space was emphasised. The sending of strike arms to outer space would undermine the mainstays of the existing strategic stability, drastically complicate the already tense international situation and increase the danger of nuclear catastrophe. The United States is using the false shingle of Strategic Defense Initiative as a cover for the "star wars" programme.

Even if this militaristic programme is given the name "angel" the Soviet Union will be emphatically against it in view of its true designation, Andrey Gromyko said.

Both sides agreed that despite differences in social systems the USSR and Australia can develop business relations and create a good atmosphere of cooperation in most diverse fields.

Joan Child expressed her consent with the assessment of the present international situation as tense and requiring the efforts of all states to normalise it. She said that the government of Australia wanted progress at the ongoing disarmament talks and expressed the wish for the "spirit of Geneva", that manifested itself at the Soviet-American summit in November last year, to triumph.

The members of the Australian Parliament Stanley Collard, Peter Drummond, Gordon McIntosh, Norm Sanders, Robert Tickner and Keith Wright spoke about their country's foreign policy initiatives, in particular its efforts to create a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific. They also asked a number of questions about the USSR's foreign and home policy which were exhaustively answered by Andrey Gromyko. On behalf of the delegation Joan Child thanked for the conversation, for the warm reception accorded the Australian MPs in the Soviet Union. The conversation passed in a frank and well-wishing atmosphere. The conversation was attended by Comrades Demichev, Tolkunov, Voss, Menteshashvili, and other comrades, from the Soviet side, and by Edward Peacock, Australian ambassador in the USSR, from the Australian side

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RELATED ISSUES

TORONTO STAR ON CANADIAN ROLE IN ARMS REDUCTION

Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English 24 Jun 86 p A14

[Editorial]

[Text]

At a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting in Halifax recently, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said the most urgent issue facing the alliance was arms control and disarmament. The urgency had been underlined only days earlier in Washington when U.S. President Ronald Reagan raised the possibility that the Americans might ignore weapons limits set by the SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union.

"It is of fundamental importance that parties to arms control agreements comply fully with the terms of those agreements," Clark said in Halifax, repeating a message Canada had sent to Washington a week before Reagan's announcement. Since then, the President has sounded a less hawkish note; in a speech this month in Glassboro, N.J., Reagan said: "Let us leave behind efforts to seek only limits to the increase of nuclear arms and seek instead actual arms reductions — the deep and verifiable reductions that (Soviet leader Mikhail) Gorbachev and I have agreed to negotiate."

The superpowers clearly have the decisive role in arms control and disarmament, but Canada needn't be merely a bystander content with exhorting the U.S. and the Soviet Union to turn more of their swords into plowshares. In fact, Canada has been an active participant in multilateral disarmament negotiations since they first began after World War II. Canadian representatives in Stockholm, Geneva and Vienna and at the United Nations in New York continue to be forthright in articulating Canada's goals for disarmament, peace and security.

As Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said in a speech to the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control in Ottawa last fall, Canada has six specific objectives that it has been pursuing at international negotiating tables:

- ☐ Radically reducing nuclear forces and enhancing strategic stability;
- ☐ Maintaining and strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regimes;
- ☐ Negotiating a global ban on chemical weapons;
- ☐ Supporting a comprehensive test ban treaty;
- ☐ Preventing an arms race in outer space; and
- ☐ Creating a climate of international confidence that will allow the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

In addition, Canada in 1983 gave itself a unique role by setting up a verification research program under the auspices of the External Affairs Department. The program now has an annual budget of \$1 million and is designed to give Canada the capability to ascertain and certify that arms control agreements are not being breached.

There may well be a role for Canada's verification capability in the current SALT II impasse between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, since each accuses the other of violations of the limits and since Reagan, in his Glassboro address as elsewhere, has stressed the importance of verifying arms reductions. Why not send Canadian teams — possibly under UN auspices so Canada can't be accused of being a U.S. puppet — to make an independent assessment of both the American and the Soviet adherence to the SALT agreements and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty as well? Such an assessment would surely help to clear up the confusion about arms control that was precipitated by Reagan's SALT announcement; it might even help the Americans and the Soviets make more progress in their bilateral arms reduction negotiations now going on in Geneva.

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

DOBRYNIN, BAHR CONFER--Moscow, 9 Jul (TASS)--Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received today in the CPSU Central Committee Egon Bahr, member of the SPD Presidium, who is in Moscow in connection with a preparatory session of the working group of the International Commission on Disarmament and Security ("Palme Commission"). During the meeting, problems of strengthening peace and security in Central Europe and new proposals of the conference of the Warsaw Pact member-states Political Consultative Committee in Budapest were discussed. [Text] [TASS International Service in Russian 1335 GMT 9 Jul 86 LD] /12858

TASS HITS COMMITTEE ON PRESENT DANGER--Washington, 17 July (TASS)--TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports: The notorious Committee on the Present Danger has made another contribution to the heightening of world tension. It published a large report which categorically opposed any agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control. The United States should arm itself, only arm itself and nothing else--this is the way for the U.S. to achieve security, in the opinion of the committee. The authors of the report support with special zeal the "star wars" program which, according to the estimates of Rand Corporation--a conservative brain trust--can cost U.S. taxpayers a fantastic sum of about two trillion dollars. No one is very much surprised over this stand of the committee, for it is common knowledge that it is funded by the military-industrial complex. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0804 GMT 17 Jul 86 LD] /12858

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